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ABSTRACT 
In France, wine’s cultural value, identified here as the “politics of terroir,” 
produces regulatory protection that contravenes the neoliberal principles implicit in 
economic globalization.  The rise of political terroir as chronicled in this thesis illustrates 
how and why such seemingly irrational anti-liberal sentiment can come to play an 
important role in national politics.  The national trade policies that derive from this type 
of cultural politics often impact the global economy and its institutions.  Imperiled 
Western and European agricultural products, one of which is French wine, presently play 
a key role impeding global free trade.  Still, the political history of French wine tells us 
that some products, along with their attendant models of organization and production, can 
become deeply embedded in national identity, thereby making resistance to market 
adjustment especially fierce.  Indeed, this account affirms that global policy makers 
should not soon expect rational adaptation to liberal markets where culturally valuable 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. LA CRISE (THE CRISIS) ...........................................................................................1 
A. THE POLITICS OF TERROIR ......................................................................2 
B. WHY SHOULD WE CARE?..........................................................................4 
C. RELEVANCE TO GLOBAL ECONOMICS ...............................................4 
D. TRANSATLANTIC TENSIONS OVER WINE...........................................6 
E. FRENCH CULTURE AND SECURITY IN THE FACE OF 
GLOBALIZATION .........................................................................................9 
F. ALTERNATE HYPOTHESIS......................................................................11 
G. METHODOLOGY, ORGANIZATION AND SETTING..........................14 
II. THE ROOTS OF REGULATION: 1800-1900 .......................................................19 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................19 
B. WINE, CULTURE AND POLITICS ON THE NATIONAL SCENE......20 
C. THE POLITICS OF CHAMPAGNE AND FRENCH CULTURE: 
1800-1900 ........................................................................................................22 
D. THE POLITICS OF BORDEAUX AND FRENCH CULTURE: 1800-
1900..................................................................................................................26 
E. FINDINGS......................................................................................................29 
F. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................29 
III. THE ADVENT OF REGULATION: 1901 TO 1935 ..............................................31 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................31 
B. THE LAW OF 1905: COUNTERING FRAUD ..........................................32 
C. THE LAW OF 1919: DEFINING THE AO ................................................34 
1. Midi (Languedoc-Roussillon)............................................................35 
2. Champagne.........................................................................................39 
D. THE AOC REGULATORY SYSTEM OF 1935 ........................................44 
E. FINDINGS......................................................................................................48 
F. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................49 
IV. ENDURING REGULATION: 1936-2007................................................................51 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................51 
B. THE 1935 FALLOUT....................................................................................52 
C. WINE ON THE NATIONAL SCENE: AS TIME WENT BY ..................55 
D. CONTEMPORARY GLOBALIZATION AND FRENCH WINE ...........58 
1. Domestic Concerns.............................................................................59 
2. Resistance to Globalization ...............................................................61 
a. The Problem of Shifting Demand ..........................................61 
b. The Problem of Rigidity..........................................................63 
3. Champagne.........................................................................................65 
E. FINDINGS......................................................................................................68 
F. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................68 
V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................71 
 viii
A. FINDINGS......................................................................................................72 
B. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS...................................................................73 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................79 

























I. LA CRISE (THE CRISIS) 
The current state of the wine industry in France has come to be commonly known 
as “la crise,”1 a notion that suggests a sector downtrend without an end in sight.2  While 
more wine is being consumed worldwide than at any other time in human history, wine’s 
traditional home finds itself in possession of less global market share than ever before.3  
From every point on the quality spectrum, embattled French winemakers face broad 
economic, political and cultural shifts that are altering international and domestic 
consumption patterns.4  These shifts not only undermine the profitability of the French 
wine industry, but they also compel many vintners to change the very nature of French 
wines (taste, structure, bouquet, etc.) as they seek to become and remain competitive at 
home and abroad.  Meanwhile, scores of winemakers are going out of business.  Lands 
formerly devoted to growing grapes stand dormant.  Bottled wine can now be found 
cheaper in France than bottled water.5  Even high-end wines are sometimes distilled into 
low grade industrial alcohol, which often ends up being ignominiously blended into 
automobile gasoline.  The situation, as The New York Times puts it, “is a painful thing in 
a land where winemaking is a labor of love and the fruit of that labor is celebrated as 
much as any art.”6 
One would expect la crise to generate solicitations for political intervention, 
which in turn should lead to protection for the wine industry, as has been the case in years 
past.  But one of the key problems today is that already existing protection ties the hands 
of French vignerons who might otherwise be able to adapt to the demands of an ever-
adjusting international wine market.  The French face a political dilemma without an 
obvious solution, save simply making room for ten of thousands of vignerons on the state 
                                                 
1 Kim Markus, “Fear in Southern France,” Wine Spectator, 15 June 2005, 49. 
2 Roger Voss, “The Crisis Facing French Wine,” The Wine Enthusiast, 1 December 2004, 24. 
3 Ahmed ElAmin, “VinExpo embraces wine market shift,” Beveragedaily.com, 21 June 2005, 
http://www.beveragedaily.com/news/ng.asp?id=60797, accessed 22 January 2006.  
4 Markus, 49. 
5 Craig S. Smith, “Fine French Wine Has New Use: Fueling Cars,” The International Herald Tribune, 
6 October 2005. 
6 Ibid. 
2 
unemployment rolls.  Given the exalted cultural status of wine and winemaking in 
France, permitting a disastrous social outcome of this sort is not an option for the 
government.   
What, then, is to be done?  Can this cycle be broken?  Many economists, policy 
consultants and journalists have attempted to answer these questions.  Remedies are 
readily available, and all point in the same direction.  France must dismantle the already 
existing burdensome protection system.  This implies that the state provide a soft landing 
to the losers among those affected by such a policy adjustment.  The winners, however, 
would be poised to guarantee the preeminence of French wine in years ahead.  But 
unequivocally, if France’s wine industry is to survive and prosper, the regulation, 
targeted tariffs, subsidies and price supports need to be overhauled.  Yet these protections 
remain mostly intact, despite the continuing decline of the French wine industry.  Why? 
 
A. THE POLITICS OF TERROIR 
In seeking to explain the origins and persistence of French wine protection, one 
can point to several factors.  Yet an integral part of the equation has been mostly 
overlooked in conventional analysis.  It is identified here as the “politics of terroir,” a 
cultural force that is gaining momentum over time.  During the Golden Age of French 
wine (1860-1875) this concept of political terroir lacked political salience.  While the 
government did modestly intervene in the wine trade in these nascent years, culturally 
based politics did not have a role.  Later, in the early twentieth century, the “politics of 
terroir” were a minor part of the original political climate that brought about a massive 
regulatory intervention.  Today, on the other hand, this cultural phenomenon is a key 
reason for the maintenance of the vital protection that is provided by the regulatory 
system.  In fact, the unmistakable expansionist trend suggests that the ascendant “politics 
of terroir” now give primary explanation to the perseverance of modern protections.   
The trend also lends itself to the conclusion that regulation, the mainstay of French wine 
industry protection, will remain so long as political terroir remains an important political 
reality. 
For the purposes of this research, the political concept of terroir has three main 
components.  First is the idea that French national identity is associated with French 
3 
wines and the Appellation d’Origine Contrôlée (AOC) system that regulates them.  In 
this line of thinking, wine is also regarded as an integral part of a broader national haute 
culture that is quintessentially French.  The second part, which a function of the AOC 
regulatory system itself, is the perceived French national responsibility to ensure that 
wine is heterogeneous from year to year, and from place to place.  The third key part of 
this concept is termed here “prerogatives of place.”  This is the notion in France of a 
national duty to protect traditional winemaking methodology in a given collectively 
cultivated area and to allow wines to speak for their place as naturally as possible.  Taken 
together, these three elements add up to one cultural factor, the “politics of terroir.”   
A clear distinction should be drawn between political terroir and viticultural 
terroir.  The “politics of terroir” is hypothesized for the purposes of the ensuing analysis.  
The French word terroir, on the other hand, signifies all of the unique natural qualities of 
a specific, fixed vineyard area as expressed through its wine, as well as the natural, 
traditionally prescribed methods used during the winemaking process.  According to the 
government's official website, Vins de France, Terroir is “a land area possessing 
distinctive physical, topographical and climatic characteristics that combine to create a 
unique wine that expresses those characteristics in its organoleptic features and 
personality.”7  
In explaining how the proposed political transformation has evolved, this research 
traces political terroir alongside the various other, more rationalistic, or instrumentalist, 
causes for French wine regulation.  Ultimately, the “politics of terroir” emerges today as 
more potent relative to other causal factors than ever before.  As a result, this cultural 
factor in large part explains the enduring rigidity of French wine regulation in the face of 
global market forces that would, in a more rationalistic world, otherwise dictate an 
altogether different path. 
 
                                                 
7 Wines of France website: www.frenchwinesfood.com/raisinauvin/glossaire.aspx?Lettre=T, accessed 
15 January 2006. 
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B. WHY SHOULD WE CARE? 
Broadly speaking, the struggling French wine industry is an ideal case study in 
globalization on many levels.  More specifically, la crise should matter in U.S. foreign 
policy circles for three major practical reasons.  First, the ensuing analysis sheds light on 
how the politics of culture can affect the general health of the international marketplace.  
Not only does French wine figure prominently in global commerce, but its interests also 
reflect those of many other Western agricultural sectors.  Like the French wine industry, 
these sectors tend to resist trade liberalization.  Yet in the view of many observers, the 
agricultural protections that are consequent to such opposition constitute the greatest 
current obstacle to lifting millions of global citizens out of poverty.  Second, the interests 
of the French wine industry directly impact bilateral economic relations between the 
United States and Europe.  At the very least, the wine industry should be understood as 
one of the few sectors that strains an otherwise harmonious US-European Union (EU) 
trade relationship.  Third, la crise has foreign policy relevance to the extent that it 
manifests itself as a security issue for the French.  Indeed, many in France see it exactly 
in these terms.  When the French feel less secure because the expression of “Frenchness” 
through viticulture8 is somehow undermined, reverberations are likely to be felt 
internationally.   
 
C. RELEVANCE TO GLOBAL ECONOMICS 
In late December 2005, the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations in 
Hong Kong (a part of the Doha Development Agenda) essentially hinged on the thorny 
issue of agricultural market protection in the developed world.  The crisis facing French 
wine, and the resulting political fallout, perfectly illustrates why such protections remain 
in place.  Heavily affected as their business is by subsidies, price supports and regulation, 
French winemakers are more politically favored than most Western agricultural sectors.   
Furthermore, during the same timeframe, European Union budget deliberations in 
Brussels aimed to determine EU spending for the years 2007 to 2013.  After much 
posturing and debate, some semblance of compromise was eventually devised in both 
                                                 
8 Leo A. Loubere provides clarity on terminology: “viticulture is the growing of grape vines, 
viniculture is the knowledge of making wine, and vinification regards the process by which grape juice is 
converted into wine.”  The Red and the White (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1978), xx. 
5 
Hong Kong and Brussels.  The two parallel meetings concluded on the same day.  But 
afterwards the media promptly learned that the WTO deal (the Hong Kong Declaration) 
would never have come about had not EU leaders first reached their own compromise.9  
One of the foremost political hurdles during the negotiations in Brussels was reform of 
the budget-busting (over 40% of the total EU budget10) Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), from which French vignerons profit disproportionately to the tune of 1.35 billion 
dollars per year.  In some years, winemakers have even collected as much as nine percent 
of France’s total CAP subsidy.11 
Although the December 2005 WTO and EU forums were regarded by some as 
tenuous steps toward further multilateral unity, upon their completion, the European 
agricultural lobby surely felt their side had won the day.  Final resolution to the 
agricultural issues being negotiated was ultimately put off for another day, and protection 
for French farmers remains virtually unchanged today.12  Moreover, it remains to be seen 
whether Europe will fully adhere to its Hong Kong pledge to phase out export subsidies 
by 2013.  Even if that were to occur, non-tariff barriers, a common byproduct of 
regulation, will continue to distort market functionality for the foreseeable future. 
The French wine industry is just one example of why and how cultural backlash 
can take root in today’s global economy.  However, it is an especially powerful example 
because French wines and their specific terroirs are not only about the expression of a 
product that is culturally transcendent in terms of identity, but also because they concern 
the value of place and tradition.  This idea that identity, place and tradition warrant 
protection is not unique to France.  The American cotton industry, for one, relies heavily 
on these sentiments when lobbying for government protection.  Indeed, the National 
Cotton Council unabashedly appeals to patriotism and American identity when touting  
 
                                                 
9 Graham Bowley, “EU Accord on budget linked to WTO deal,” International Herald Tribune, 20 
December 2005. 
10 Philip H. Gordon and Nicolas de Boisgrollier, “Why the French Love Their Farmers,” Yale Global, 
15 November 2005, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=6510, accessed 11 January 2006. 
11 Kym Anderson, “Wine’s New World”, Foreign Policy, 1 May 2003, 4. 
12 The Economist, “Hard Truths: The Doha trade round is still alive, but hardly healthy,” The 
Economist, 20 December 2005. 
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the cultural value of its product.13  Politicians in the United States tend to acquiesce in the 
face of such culturally based political pressure.  As a result, the cotton industry continues 
to enjoy substantial protection today, despite the consequent negative implications for 
multilateral trade expansion.  Such an outcome ultimately, and irrationally, undermines 
national economic growth across the board.  The Japanese rice industry serves as another 
prominent example of culturally based belligerence in the face of rational market 
pressures that demand sector adjustment.  The following statement by one rice farmer 
crystallizes the nature of the political capital in play: “Time was when people felt a 
responsibility to care for the land you received from your parents and they from their 
parents, and this was central to Japanese culture."14  At the same time, the billions of 
dollars Japan distributes yearly for rice protection do not come without a price.  Other 
industries in Japan have come to resent such agricultural protection measures because 
they have led to the demise of numerous free-trade agreements with developing nations 
that export farm products. 
 
D. TRANSATLANTIC TENSIONS OVER WINE 
In U.S.-E.U. economic relations, the subject of wine is best characterized as 
contentious.  From the U.S. perspective, the EU seems determined to give unfair 
advantages to French vignerons.  Indeed, warranted or not, European Union wine policy 
has been, and remains, primarily a product of French viticultural interests.  To help 
France, as well as other European wine producing nations, the EU has erected numerous 
barriers that aim to stall competition from the United States and elsewhere.  One case in 
point is that tariffs on U.S. wine imported into the European Union are about twice as 
high as those on European wine coming into America.15  More significant symbolically, 
since they exemplify the differing views on the importance of de-regulation, are the non-
tariff barriers that make selling American wine in Europe problematic. 
                                                 
13 The Cotton Council Official Web Site, “Cotton: The Perennial Patriot,” 
http://www.cotton.org/pubs/cottoncounts/upload/Cotton-The-Perennial-Patriot.pdf, accessed 1 February 
2006. 
14 Andres Martinez, “Who Said Anything About Rice? Free Trade is About Car and PlayStations,” 
The New York Times, 10 August 2003. 
15 James M. Murphy, “U.S. Hopes for a Deal on Wines – And What to Call Them,” European Affairs, 
Winter 2003. 
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Add to this that, for all the standard reasons, the United States is actively 
searching for ways to reduce its growing trade deficit ($94.3 billion in 2003, $110 billion 
in 2004) with Europe.  Part of this effort is a diligent two-decade fight to dismantle many 
of the barriers to American wine in Europe.  In both 200416 and 2005,17 the EU section of 
the National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, published by the office 
of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), highlighted U.S. dismay over 
impediments to the free trade of wine.  The exact language, emphasized for symbolic 
reasons in the overview section of the 2004 report, went: “EU barriers cited in this report 
(for example wine restrictions and agricultural biotechnology) are the result of restrictive 
regulatory approaches that often fail to reflect a sound assessment of actual risks posed 
by the goods in question...”18  This language refers to a particularly controversial non-
tariff barrier, the Geographic Indicator (GI).  Some background is in order. 
The EU has sought universal GI recognition for many years.  GIs include world-
renowned regional labels such as Champagne, Cognac, and Bordeaux, all of which are 
treated throughout Europe as if they were intellectual property—much to the chagrin of 
U.S. trade negotiators.19  From the U.S. viewpoint, GIs are a thinly veiled form of 
protectionism.20  Nonetheless, the United States has traditionally been in favor of 
compromising on this issue so long as Europe was willing to permit imports employing 
high tech new-world winemaking methods.  But this has become a big problem for the 
Europeans, who generally see such practices as the bastardization of a natural product.   
Still, from the mid-1980s forward, U.S. wine producers have been able to export 
to Europe with the help of successive temporary exemptions from purist EU winemaking 
                                                 
16 USTR, 2004 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, 137, 
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2004/Section_Index.html, accessed 2 
February 2006. 
17 USTR, 2005 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, 
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2005/Section_Index.html, accessed 2 
February 2006. 
18 USTR, 2004 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, 
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2004/Section_Index.html, accessed 2 
February 2006. 
19 Ibid, 137. 
20 Murphy, “U.S. Hopes for a Deal on Wines – And What to Call Them,” 
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regulations.21  But from 2003 to 2005, EU enforcements of labeling regulations became 
increasingly burdensome for U.S. producers.22  Bilateral discord over the wine trade 
swelled as a result.  From the European point of view, the U.S. negotiating stance sought 
to, “enshrine American wine-making practices (which are) banned in Europe,” the effect 
of which would basically wipe out EU Geographic Indicator laws.23  The tension 
eventually came to a head when the United States threatened a wine war with Europe in 
June of 2005.  To flex its muscles, the Bush Administration signaled it would not hesitate 
to tighten enforcement of the Bioterrorism Act, a law whose passage intended to protect 
the homeland from potentially hazardous food and drink imports in the aftermath of 
September 11, 2001.24  Had the United States chosen to enforce the law, all European 
agricultural imports might have been obstructed.25 
In the end, cooler heads prevailed and the two sides signed a wine deal in early 
2006.  Under the compromise, which has since taken effect, American access to 
European markets is far less procedurally cumbersome and producers are able to make 
use of techniques still prohibited in Europe.  Some of these include using oak chips for 
flavoring, adding ion extractors to reduce acidity and supplementing wine with water in 
order to lower alcohol levels.26  In return, U.S. producers agreed to discontinue the 
American use of just seventeen prominent European Geographic Indicator names, 
including Chianti, Burgundy and Champagne.  But U.S. companies currently using a 
European Geographic Indicator, such as Korbel with its “California Champagne” line, 
were grandfathered into the deal.27  On the whole, the agreement was a far cry from what 
the EU had hoped for. Indeed, many European winegrowers deemed the arrangement 
entirely unacceptable.  France’s biggest confederation of wine unions, the CCVF 
(Confédération des Caves Viticoles Françaises) called on the European Commission to 
                                                 
21 BBC News, “US and EU agree wine names deal,” BBC News, 15 September 2005. 
22 USTR, 2004, 137. 
23 Agence France Presse, “US threatens wine war with Europe,” 22 June 2005. 
24 Agence France Presse, “US threatens wine war with Europe,” 22 June 2005. 
25 Boyd Farrow, “Red, Red Whine,” CNBC European Business, date unknown, 
http://www.europeanbusiness.eu.com/features/2005/dec/newworld.html, accessed 18 January 2006. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Adam Lechmere, “New Wine Accord ‘absurd’: Paillard,” Decanter.com, 19 September 2005, 
http://www.decanter.com/news/68703.html, accessed 14 January 2006. 
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reject the compromise.  Member states Germany, Austria and Portugal—numbers four 
through six in terms of wine industry stature—formally opposed the EU-US wine deal.28  
As well, the Institut National des Appellations d’Origine (INAO), charged with 
approving and administering all French wine regulation, decided in October 2006 to 
outlaw the use of wood chips in all high-end AOC wines.29  It is therefore clear that, for 
the French at least, the battle over the composition and expression of wine sold in Europe 
still rages. 
 
E. FRENCH CULTURE AND SECURITY IN THE FACE OF 
GLOBALIZATION 
Without a doubt, wine’s status in France far outstrips that which its economic 
output alone would signify.  Such is the case because wine is seen by the French to be an 
iconic pillar of the national culture and lifestyle.  In their book, Wine and War: The 
French, The Nazis and the Battle for France’s Greatest Treasure, Don and Petie 
Kladstrup write that, “Like the flag, the tricolore, [wine] goes to the country’s heart and 
soul.”  They also go on to point out that wine injects something spiritual into the national 
psyche.  One vigneron told the authors: 
Our wines evolve slowly and nobly, carrying with them hopes for a 
prolonged life.  We know our land was here before we came and that it 
will be here long after we are gone.  With our wine, we have survived the 
wars, the Revolution and Phylloxera.  Each harvest renews promises made 
in the spring.  We live with the continuing cycle.  This gives us a taste of 
eternity.30 
And it is no coincidence that this first-hand testament of the winemaking experience in 
France captures much of the sentiment ingrained in the “politics of terroir”.  
In addition to the cultural connection with its wine, France is accustomed to 
defining the essence of what wine is and what wine should be for the rest of the world.  
                                                 
28 Sam Edmonds, “Germany Sour Over US-EU Wine Deal,” Deutche Welle, 12 December 2005, 
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,1830394,00.html, accessed 17 January 2006. 
29 Chris Mercer, “France Moves to Limit Wood Chips in Wine,” Beveragedaily.com, 24 October 
2006, http://www.beveragedaily.com/news/ng.asp?n=71524-french-wine-wood-chips-wine, accessed 24 
January 2006. 
30 Don and Petie Kladstrup, Wine and War: The French, The Nazis and the Battle for France’s 
Greatest Treasure, (New York: Random House, 2001), 10. 
10 
According to The Wine Bible, “Like French food, French wine has been the benchmark 
against which greatness elsewhere is judged.”31  The implications of this phenomenon are 
far-reaching, as indeed one implicit duty for winemakers over the years was the export of 
French culture through French wine.  That the terroir viticultural concept is even 
considered a valid notion in the non-European, new world of wine is itself a testament to 
the weight carried by traditional French winemaking culture.32  Also contributing to 
France’s traditional primacy in the global wine industry has been the spread of French 
vines.  For some unknown reason, almost all of the wine grapes grown outside of Europe 
originated in France.33  Even within Europe, French noble varieties like Cabernet 
Sauvignon, Merlot, Syrah, Chardonnay, Pinot Gris and Sauvignon Blanc are featured in 
high-end Spanish, Portuguese and Italian wines either on their own or as part of a blend.  
The dynamic almost never works in the reverse direction.34  As a result of this vine 
propagation, “French winemaking techniques (and) viticultural practices…have been 
adopted by wine regions around the world.”35  Over the years, this transmission of 
French wine tradition has reinforced the importance of wine as something that possesses 
“Frenchness.”  
But today, rather than reinforcing the “Frenchness” of this iconic beverage, 
globalization is undermining France’s position in the world of wine.  By extension, 
French notions of cultural security are being threatened at the same time.  In their book, 
The French Challenge: Adapting to Globalization, authors Sophie Meunier and Phillip H. 
Gordon tell us that, “If the impact of globalization on France were merely economic, the 
French would probably not find it so problematic.”36  This speaks to the widely held view 
                                                 
31 MacNeil, p. 112. 
32 MacNeil, p. 112. 
33 One exception is Riesling, although it is associated almost as much with Alsace in France as it is 
with Germany or Austria in connoisseur circles.  A second is Zinfandel, whose original home was Croatia 
before it migrated to Italy, and later to California. 
34 Although the Mourvedre and Grenache grapes originated in Spain, both became world-famous due 
to the wines they produced on French soil.  Mourvedre came to France in the late middle ages from 
Valencia.34 Grenache migrated from Aragon to Southern France in the early 1700s, 
http://www.tablascreek.com/grenache.html, accessed 10 January 2006. 
35 MacNeil,112. 
36 Sophie Meunier and Phillip H. Gordon, The French Challenge: Adapting to Globalization 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2001), 41. 
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in France that a harmful convergence is taking place due to the expanding global 
marketplace.  Specifically, the French fear that globalization renders cultural 
undertakings more homogenous every day.  Under this logic, food is ever more like 
McDonalds every day; French entertainment is increasingly influenced by Hollywood 
and American culture; and the language of international life, even in France, is 
increasingly English.  Because endeavors like food, entertainment and language all 
contribute to what it means to be French, globalization is seen by some 56 percent of the 
citizenry as a threat to national identity.  As well, some 74 percent of young people (ages 
15-24) in France believe the United States, seen as the ultimate pusher of globalization, 
exerts too much influence in French society.37  These statistics explain why “almost all 
French politicians support efforts to limit globalization when it comes to culture and 
identity.”38   
Like food, entertainment and language, wine is similarly colored by notions of 
culture and “Frenchness.”  The corollary here is that the French wine crisis therefore also 
sheds light on the broader culturally based national resistance to globalization.  This is 
important because as globalization undercuts French wine and thus French cultural 
identity, French feelings of security are affected as well.  Insecurity of this sort gives 
some explanation to the recent revival of economic nationalism in France.  Culturally 
based uncertainty can also make anti-American and anti-global measures more popular 
politically.  To be sure, less secure translates easily into less stable, which tends to impact 
multilateral priorities.  At the very least, cultural insecurity helped fuel the French 
rejection of the EU constitution in 2005. 
 
F. ALTERNATE HYPOTHESIS 
Most fundamentally, this thesis asks what accounts for French wine protection, 
and why it persists today.  With respect the first part of this question, the answer given 
here is that instrumentalist factors largely account for the original government efforts to 
protect French winemakers.  As well, it posits that the “politics of terroir” is integral to 
the doggedness of the modern regulatory system.  Those who have broadly chronicled the 
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evolution of the French wine industry tend to rely on the instrumentalist side of the story, 
whether motivated by economic or political considerations, or a combination of the two.  
Authors who have focused on the early foundations of French wine protection similarly 
rely on rationalistic factors.  The same is true for those who principally analyze the nature 
of the modern crisis.  Given this common theme, instrumentalism as the motivation for 
intervention into French wine markets is the proposed alternate hypothesis.   
It should be noted that three considerations make it difficult to present the 
competing hypothesis in a way that would most effectively refute the central argument 
here.  First, there is no singular point of reference on the interface between wine and 
French politics generally.39  Second, this thesis evaluates the evolution of factors 
contributing to French wine regulation, something no other study has attempted.  (That 
one of these factors, the “politics of terroir” is essentially novel here is a further 
complication.)  Second, no known author has hypothesized on the various factors 
contributing to French wine regulation during the timeframe inclusive to this thesis.  This 
lack of available material explains why the proposed alternate hypothesis is somewhat 
conceptual in nature.   
Many modern commentators on the French wine crisis openly dismiss the idea 
that cultural factors help preserve regulatory legislation.  Hence, they tend to misdiagnose 
the crisis in the French wine industry.  Even so, examples of their analysis, imbued as it is 
with instrumentalist economic pragmatism, elucidate the alternative hypothesis.   
The first example, standing in direct contrast with an assertion of political 
terroir’s substantial role in the modern regulatory scheme, interprets existing government 
interventions to be merely a product of attempts to insulate vignerons from potentially 
harsh economic realities.  The perspective of noted agricultural economist Kym 
Anderson,40 advanced in a May 2003 Foreign Policy article, epitomizes this viewpoint.  
In his estimation, the protection sought by winemakers is, “ostensibly” about cultural 
preservation, which implies that considerations such as natural winemaking methods and 
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prerogatives of style, which he terms, “so-called traditional expressions,” do not really 
factor into the ongoing struggle to preserve French wine regulation.41  In a similar vein, 
Roger Voss of The Wine Enthusiast, in a piece entitled, “The Crisis Facing French Wine” 
disregards the value of the cultural factors pertinent to wine regulation.  Focusing instead 
on the economic side of the story, he implores his readers to, “forget the image (French) 
wine has of a lovely lifestyle; it’s a business.”42   
Mr. Voss also observes that given the market-driven realities of the situation, it 
should come as no surprise that, “consolidation is rampant.”  He implies that such a 
course is inevitable today, and that given the nature and power of the market forces, 
regulatory forces cannot continue to protect the minor growers.  They are expected to be 
weeded out.43  Yet today, France remains the most fractured and diverse of all the major 
wine producing nations.  Small growers continue to dominate the politicization of the 
nation’s viticulture and large companies are rare.  The number of proprietors who grow 
their own grapes, and make and sell their own wine is actually growing.44  A striking 
statistic: compared to Australia’s 1,800 commercial wine producers, in June of 2005 
France still had 112,500 firms to mix with its 300,000 wine growers.45  Admittedly, some 
consolidation is indeed taking place.  But more remarkable is that French wine 
production remains so fragmented in the globalized marketplace.  While Mr. Voss pays 
no heed to it, the present analysis suggests that the “politics of terroir,” and its role in 
maintaining regulation, largely accounts for this state of affairs.  Actually, a relevant 
study prompted by Mr. Voss’ assertion might seek to determine how much the French 
wine industry can consolidate in spite of the constraints.  However, one of the 
implications of the argument made here is that this would be a very difficult calculation 
to make due to the political weight of culture, an intangible concept that is not easily 
quantified.   
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G. METHODOLOGY, ORGANIZATION AND SETTING 
As it is heavily infused with ideas of a collective French identity, duty and 
responsibility, the “politics of terroir” identified in this paper is by definition a national 
phenomenon.  The evidence will therefore be evaluated according to how it may or may 
not pertain to national politics.  This is not to say, for example, that efforts to protect 
natural or traditional winemaking in France are not sometimes driven by local identity, 
duty or responsibilities.  Indeed, such local concerns often reinforce national wine 
politics.  But under French wine law, locally derived ideas that seek protection in the 
form of regulation must also be endorsed and administered by the INAO, which operates 
under the auspices of the Ministry of Agriculture.  It follows logically that any local push 
for regulation must also have national political appeal. 
Under ideal conditions, this paper would lean only on evidence pointing directly 
to the status of national political terroir.  However, much of the available evidence is 
more regionally based, coming out of three major French vineyard areas, Bordeaux, the 
Languedoc-Roussillon and Champagne.  As a consequence, these regions will be leaned 
on heavily in the ensuing analysis.  Still, given that the “politics of terroir” is a national 
phenomenon, the analysis focuses on the nature, and effects, of the appeals for national 
intervention, even when drawing on events and pleas emanating from Bordeaux, 
Champagne or the Midi—the key historic area in today’s Languedoc-Roussillon.  Only 
where there is an absence of protection and political interaction at the national level will 
the analysis move to the regional level. 
In addition to the availability of material on these three French wine regions, 
Bordeaux and Champagne are especially appropriate because their distinctions allow for 
a discriminating look the “politics of terroir.”  This is the case largely because the 
circumstances of Champagne production are quite unique when compared to the rest of 
France.  Further, the opposite is true in Bordeaux, where production circumstances are for 
the most part similar to those seen throughout the country.  For the purposes of this paper 
then, Bordeaux will serve to reflect the situation for the rest of France.  The realities of 
Champagne act as a contrast because they more closely resemble the wine production in 
the rest of the world.  While the wines from Champagne and Bordeaux are both 
powerfully linked to national identity, and the AOC system is seen as something that 
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possesses “Frenchness” in both regions, the regions are very different in their reflection 
of the final two parts of the cultural equation identified here as political terroir. 
Many factors account for Champagne’s atypical place in the French wine 
industry, but three are most essential.  First, numerous sub-regions, or smaller 
appellations (AOCs), exist in other French wine regions, but there is only one regulatory 
geographic designation for Champagne.  As for Bordeaux, it has fifty-seven total AOC 
districts grouped into six families in accordance with style and geography.  To use a 
practical example for clarification, some (often exclusive) bottles of Bordeaux carry the 
label Pauillac, a smaller village in the Haut-Medoc, while others carry the broader Haut-
Medoc appellation on the label.  Even broader is the appellation Bordeaux Supérieur, 
which is followed by the general Bordeaux, each with progressively lax production 
standards as the appellation broadens geographically.46  In Champagne, however, all 
bottles carry the designation of appellation Champagne.  The second key distinction in 
Champagne is that large firms, with an interest in maintaining brand-like standards of 
consistency, dominate the wine trade far more than in any other French wine region.  To 
be more precise, around 15,000 growers provide the grapes for one hundred and ten large 
firms.47  The third reason is that the best selling Champagnes today are blends, in which 
the grapes contributing to each bottle are likely to come from multiple vintages and 
multiple vineyard locations. 
In this analysis, regulatory law is the key to tracing the nature of the political 
foundations for intervention for three main reasons.  First, French winemakers see it as 
more beneficial than any other available form of protection.  Second, given its potency 
and ubiquity in French wine markets, regulation and its political foundations are the 
easiest to track.  Third, regulation is the form of government intervention most 
powerfully linked to the concepts central to the “politics of terroir” as proposed in this 
paper.  Other protections (such as tax structure, price supports, subsidies and tariffs) also 
lean on some of the ideas embedded in the “politics of terroir,” but to a lesser degree.  
The second aspect of the political terroir posited here, the responsibility to produce end 
product variety, is purely a function of regulatory protection.  As well, the AOC 
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regulatory system itself is now a part of French identity.  Unfortunately though, in the 
early years (Chapter II) of the French wine industry, regulation was lacking altogether.  
So, to make the central thesis argument, that the “politics of terroir” is on the ascent, the 
foundations of other forms of protection must be analyzed during these years.   
To review then, political terroir involves the idea that wine needs to be protected 
for cultural reasons.  The rationale invokes feelings of wine’s connection to French 
identity, a national duty to protect wine variety and a responsibility to preserve traditional 
and natural methods.  If these factors are part of an appeal for national level protection in 
the historical sequence of events, and intervention results, it will be taken as an indication 
of terroir’s political salience during a particular period.  But if a terroir based argument 
yields limited government intervention, the political weight of the appeal must be put in 
doubt.  So both the nature of the argument, as well as its result, warrants evaluation.  
Weighing these two pieces together will tell us about the salience the “politics of terroir,” 
as well as the nature of its causality, as it has progressed over the years.   
In each of the ensuing chapters, the “politics of terroir” is weighed against 
economic and politically derived instrumentalist forces as potential causal factors for the 
existence of protection.  Yet in order to make the argument central to this paper, that the 
“politics of terroir” is an overlooked concept that merits ever more consideration, the 
approach tends to be on viewing events through a cultural lens.   
Chapter II sets the stage for the evolution of French wine culture by looking at the 
period before national regulation, 1800 to 1900.  During this timeframe, wine production 
in France expanded, paralleling the rise of the industrial era and a first major phase of 
economic globalization, during which international “integration and progress went hand 
in hand.”48  Chapter II also lays the groundwork for two of the geographic areas relevant 
to this analysis, Champagne and Bordeaux.  Chapter III concentrates on the years 1901 to 
1935, with priority placed on the run-up to, and the implementation of, the 1935 AOC 
regulatory system.  In this period, as was the case with most globally traded products, the 
wine trade peaked, and then plummeted in concert with the onset of the Great 
Depression.  As chapter III closes just prior to World War Two, global protectionism and 
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extreme zero sum economic nationalism dominated the international trade landscape.  
This political environment influenced the seminal event of this paper, which is the birth 
of the AOC system.  Yet in practice the wine regulatory system of 1935 had a lot more in 
common with dirigisme, the free-market statism that characterized much of the French 
economy in the postwar years.  Chapter IV, which encompasses the contemporary phase 
of French wine history, from 1936 to 2007, shows why this is the case.  The French wine 
industry, much like the rest of France, grew steadily in the middle of the twentieth 
century under the direction of a capable bureaucracy in Paris.  Eventually, however, 
contemporary globalization took hold.  Mirroring the situation with other important 
French products, ever changing market conditions made continued state guidance of the 
wine industry untenable.  That is where things stand today. 
Since the “politics of terroir” is a powerful cultural dynamic, the French will in 
all likelihood continue to be forced to adapt to la crise within the constraints of the 
current regulatory system.  This is the case because the basic cultural pretext for 
regulation remains non-negotiable, even while France’s position in global wine markets 
is ever weakened as a result.  Simply put, cultural politics have trumped purely rational 
economics.  As such, the culturally based “politics of terroir” fit neatly into Max Weber’s 
theoretical distinction between instrumental rationality and substantive rationality.  Even 
though broader national economic interests might dictate instrumentalist means-ends 
matching, the French body politic instead chooses a different course of action, which is 
the maintenance of its wine regulatory system.  This is very much a value-oriented 
rationalism, in which the substantive values are French identity and the communication 
of terroir through wine.  Indeed, the French continue to make a choice for a wine 
regulation, an “irrational” choice, because in France the totality of wine’s value far 



















II. THE ROOTS OF REGULATION: 1800-1900 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The phylloxera vine disease devastated the vineyards of France in the late 
nineteenth century.  Yet its origins were not French.  Phylloxera crossed the Atlantic 
implanted in North American vines, during a period of viticulture experimentations in 
France.  In terms of historical memory, phylloxera became the original external force to 
seriously damage France’s vignerons.  In due time, the vignerons of France would be 
harmed by other crises emanating from abroad, to include World War One, The Great 
Depression, World War Two, an invasion of cheap Algerian wine, and of course the 
crisis of Globalization they face today.  But to many, phylloxera was the French wine 
industry’s foundational encounter with globalization. 
To fully appreciate the impact of this seminal event, as well as the foundations for 
the regulation that it would eventually help to induce, it is first necessary to understand 
the cultural and economic context in which French wine was produced before phylloxera.  
This chapter provides that context.  More relevant to the central thesis argument, the 
chapter also evaluates the cultural salience of French wine vis a vis the instrumentalist 
factors working to persuade government intervention into wine markets during this 
timeframe.  This foundation will serve as a starting point for the chronological trend 
analysis that aims to verify the developing strength of terroir as a political factor in 
France.   
The first section of the chapter examines the cultural and economic standing of 
viticulture in France prior to the onset of phylloxera.  The second section addresses the 
national strength of the “politics of terroir” and the general nature of political 
intervention during this timeframe.  In section three, the situation in Champagne sheds 
light on the circumstances surrounding wine’s original connection to French culture.  
Section four regards the politics of the Bordeaux wine region in the nineteenth century.  
Within, initial government courting of vignerons is highlighted, as is the advent of the 
renowned Medoc classification of 1855.  The fifth section addresses findings relevant to 
the broader questions posed by this thesis.  
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B. WINE, CULTURE AND POLITICS ON THE NATIONAL SCENE 
In a purely economic sense, phylloxera did not lay waste to an insignificant niche 
industry in France.  Wine in fact held a vital position in the national economy prior to the 
onset of the vine disease in 1875.  One way or another, the wine trade employed one sixth 
of the French population in 1870.  By that time, the wine industry had become a major 
export sector, and was turning out the nation’s leading cash crop.49  Wine was 
increasingly mass-produced throughout most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
although such was the case in some areas more than others.  The Languedoc in the south 
of France was the region most uniformly dedicated to viticulture.  Farms in other regions 
were more diversified, thereby mitigating dependence on wine markets.  But the broader 
story is one of rising urban and foreign demand creating much incentive for farmers 
across France to specialize in wine.  They did so in droves.  To those who survived the 
traumas that came at the very end of the century, the culminating years of 1850 to 1880 
would come to be regarded as the “Golden Age” of wine in France.50 
But in terms of culture, what was the standing of wine and viticulture in this 
period?  To be sure, even well before French wine’s golden age, the cultural link to wine 
was present.  As far back as the early modern period, wine already held cultural capital in 
France to go along with its economic value.  Historian Thomas Brennan writes that: 
In sacraments, ceremonies, contracts, and reconciliations, wine stood for 
unity and trust.  In pictures, poetry, drinking songs, and police ordinances, 
wine was glorified or vilified and given iconic status.  But the significance 
of wine consumption, its cultural complexity, and even its romance should 
not be allowed to obscure the fact that wine was also an important 
commodity, and, as such, it played a crucial role in the early modern 
economy.51 
This, it should be noted, refers to a time period that ended about a century prior to the 
outbreak of phylloxera.  The indication from Mr. Brennan’s account is that the French 
cultural link to wine was indeed present at time, but also that it may have taken a 
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backseat to wine’s instrumentalist value.  At any rate, it is clear that some of wine’s value 
as a commodity was already being drawn from its symbolic significance to social and 
cultural happenings. 
Incremental expansions eventually led to an 1875 output peak for French wine.52  
Statistics show that domestic consumption also followed this path.53  On the cultural side, 
the importance of French wine advanced in concert with the consumption and production 
booms, according to most observers.  Early trailblazers of gastronomy in France, men 
like Anthelme Brillat-Savarin and Alexandre Grimod de La Reyniere, openly declared 
that wine (and food) achievements were directly linked to the fate of the nation during the 
first half of the nineteenth century.54  Further, the national academy of science at the time 
asserted that French wine and its unique terroir were the starting place for the nation’s 
regeneration after losses in warfare to the Prussians.55 
When it came to politics however, wine’s cultural value won French winemakers 
relatively few favors in the nineteenth century.  To be sure, government intervention into 
wine markets and other agrarian matters was relatively infrequent during this timeframe.  
Multiple historical factors help explain why this was the case.  First, during most of the 
century, before new roads and railways linked them more closely to Paris, circumstances 
forced vignerons, like other peasants, to look for local solutions to subsistence problems.  
Their economic and political existence was largely isolated and closed off from France as 
a whole.  According to historian Eugen Weber, the transformation of the peasantry into 
citizens with a stake in nationhood did not begin until 1870.56  Second, nationalism, at 
least in terms of its role as a response to the problems of a newly internationalized 
economy, had not really gained momentum until the late nineteenth century.57  Until that 
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time, less was expected of the state when it came to the protection of national goods.  
Third, the liberal ideology and consequent globalization that characterized the times was 
widely regarded as progressive throughout most of the century.  Indeed, it was not until 
after the 1870s, largely as a response to declining grain prices and reduced freight duties, 
that anti-liberal protective tariffs were introduced in Europe.58  
Compounding the pervasive sentiment that liberalism, both political and 
economic, was mostly beneficial, French winemakers were generally prosperous as 
markets grew in conjunction with the rising industrialization of the nineteenth century.  It 
should therefore come as no surprise that, according to noted wine historian Leo Loubere, 
French vigneron politics above all consisted of, “seeking to safeguard the beverage from 
undue taxes that eager ministers and politicians sought to impose on what they perceived 
as a bottomless well of wealth.”59  Only after phylloxera hit at the very end of the 
nineteenth century could the case be made that vignerons benefited from the French fiscal 
system.  Even then, this was only the case in the southern Languedoc-Roussillon 
region.60  But where interactions with the central government did take place, there is 
relative lack of evidence to indicate that winemakers leaned on notions of the link 
between wine and cultural identity in efforts to attain political advantage in Paris.  The 
same is true regarding the idea that diverse traditions of place and natural winemaking 
methodology necessitated relief.  
 
C. THE POLITICS OF CHAMPAGNE AND FRENCH CULTURE: 1800-1900 
To some, Champagne is associated with the idea of “Frenchness” more than any 
other wine or wine region in France.  Kolleen Guy informs us that, “Within France, 
Champagne has been seen as an embodiment of the national spirit.”61  Hence, any 
examination of how ideas of patrimony and culture impact political outcomes must 
include Champagne.  Apart from its contemporary connection to identity, “more than any 
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other wine, Champagne unlocks wine’s archetypal promise: joy.”62  Many French see 
this emotive quality as being a defining national characteristic as well; a reality that today 
produces an even more fortified union of Champagne and French identity.   
The very early history, according to one observer, is uncomplicated: “the wine 
trade in Champagne (in the late eighteenth century) was an example of the triumph of 
market forces over the limits of climate,” suggesting demand was mainly a consequence 
of quality, and that rational economic dynamics were the lynchpin of success.63  But by 
the middle of the nineteenth century, as nationalism and national identity were gaining 
ground in Europe, there were hints of Champagne, and not just wine in general, being 
associated with French identity.   
Because Champagne was so dependent on exports, polyglots, usually of German 
origin, were brought to Reims and Epernay (the capitals of the Champagne business) to 
assist with sales and bookkeeping in the mid nineteenth century.  Many of these 
transplants, after years learning the trade, branched out and started their own firms.  
Prominent examples are the Mumm, Krug and Deutz firms.  The French felt threatened 
by the influx of foreigners, and their sentiment was expressed in a way that linked the 
wines of Champagne to a broader conception of national interest and geographic 
expression.  For example, one French merchant stated, “we cannot avoid expressing one 
regret: that of seeing an industry based on French soil, an industry which is so clearly of 
national interest, slip almost entirely from our hands.”64  The quoted merchant 
exaggerates the extent of the changes then taking place in Champagne, but the language 
he used is telling.  It reflects the early development of a broader national connection to 
Champagne.   
The Champagne region encountered many challenges in the nineteenth century, 
but the biggest of these was fraud.  Winemakers from the Loire, Burgundy and beyond 
assumed any sparkling wine could be labeled Champagne and intentionally misled 
consumers into believing they were buying a product from the region.  In the 1860s 
around 110 million bottles were being sold worldwide under the auspices of Champagne,                                                  
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even though official regional calculations revealed a capacity to produce only 24 million 
bottles.65  The effect was a depression of the price of real Champagne.  Quite naturally, 
the Champenois wanted to fight back.  Yet they were almost powerless to do so, owing to 
their largely unproductive avenues for legal recourse.66   
To satisfy some of the outstanding demand, several firms in Reims and Epernay 
began infusing low-priced grapes (the traditional grapes were Pinot Noir, Chardonnay 
and Pinot Meunier) into their blends.  Supply shortages also prompted merchants in the 
1870s to source grapes some 70 miles south of Epernay, in the Aube region north of 
Troyes.  The seemingly out of control situation finally compelled the major Champagne 
houses to decisively organize to protect themselves in the early 1880s.  By this time, the 
Champenois had become “increasingly aware that they could command a premium price 
for their products only if they protected the good name of Champagne, as well as their 
particular brand name.”67  Such reasoning is an indication that economic rationalism 
motivated the first moves to organize as one political voice. 
In the courts, the larger Champagne firms began to take collective action as early 
as 1844, but were rewarded very little for such efforts, both at home and abroad.68  1882 
occasioned a report indicating that sales of legitimate Champagne in the US were falling 
due to perceptions of poor quality, which highlighted the need for more forceful means of 
protection.  Consequently, that same year they established the Syndicat du Commerce des 
Vins de Champagne.  But once again, not much would come of such efforts to protect the 
authenticity of the wines from the Champagne region, at least in the short term.69  (The 
formation of the Syndicat would, however, produce beneficial results over the long term.  
It was not until 1905, however, that the French government laid the legal foundation for 
wine protection based on place of origin.) 
What else could the Champenios do to defend themselves?  One answer, it seems, 
was to reinforce the idea that their products carried with them a sense of “Frenchness.”  
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In 1889, many Champagne bottles were being decorated with patrimonial symbols such 
as flags, soldiers and battles, thereby linking the product to the French national spirit.70  
Ultimately, the marketing ploy worked, and domestic sales skyrocketed, leading to the 
conclusion that Champagne already held some form of cultural capital, at least in 
France’s major urban markets.  The cultural demand for such a connection translated 
easily into economic benefits for the vignerons of Champagne.  It was not until many 
years later, however, that this idea would also become a huge part of political arguments 
for protection. 
In her book When Champagne Became French: Wine and the Making of a 
National Identity, Kolleen Guy tells us that late nineteenth century Champagne firms 
consciously contributed to the establishment of an “imagined community” mainly to 
benefit from its financial implications.71  Her argument downplays the idea of a more 
natural initial link from Champagne to French identity.  From this perspective, what 
would become the inexorable union between the French and Champagne is best described 
as invented.72   (Parallel dynamics were also in play in Bordeaux.  In the words of Rod 
Phillips, “Prime among the inventors of tradition were the Bordeaux winemakers.”73)  
Nonetheless, the long-term implications of such “inventions” would be politically 
consequential. 
In this matter on the origins of the link to culture, the robust consumption of 
Champagne throughout France, as well as other aforementioned signs, indeed suggests 
some requisite cultural sentiment was present in the nineteenth century.  Yet a second 
crucial factor was that “private companies and local peasant organizations…were uniting 
their regional commodity to a common imagined past of France.”74  At any rate, these  
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conjured—or perhaps slightly more natural—notions about Champagne and its 
connection to identity did not significantly spillover into national politics, at least not in 
the nineteenth century.   
 
D. THE POLITICS OF BORDEAUX AND FRENCH CULTURE: 1800-1900 
For many oenophiles, “Bordeaux is the unofficial wine capital of the world.”75  
To wine writer Michel Dovaz, Bordeaux “has become the archetype of red wine.”76  
Andrew Jefford declares that Bordeaux “is to French wine what Shakespeare is to 
English drama, what Verdi is to Italian opera, or what Tolstoy is the Russian 
novel…defining not merely itself but the whole culture in which it exists.”77  Given these 
commentaries, the link from Bordeaux to broader notions of French (identity) culture is 
easy to grasp.  The connection has existed for many years, dating back to the seventeenth 
century when Bordeaux wines were first sold abroad as the “new French claret.”78 
In the nineteenth century, France witnessed three Republics (1792-1804, 1848-
1852 and 1870-1940); two Empires (1804-1814 and 1852-1870); one Restoration (1814-
1830); and a July Monarchy (1830-1848).  To put it mildly, this was a politically 
tumultuous century.  During the opening years of the century immediately following the 
French Revolution, “the newcomers (to the Bordeaux wine business) were there not to 
get involved in politics or moral issues but to make money—a great deal of money.”79  
Even though national level protection was unavailable, considering its massive size in 
terms of people, the wine sector did factor into electoral politics.  As well, the support of 
French winemakers and other farmers was vital during the undemocratic periods.80  
Accordingly, the political choice at the national level to cater to an important wine region 
like Bordeaux had implications for overall national stability.   
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In the run-up to the May 1849 national elections, Second Republic (1848-1852) 
leadership promised to remove all drink taxes in an effort to gain favor with vignerons. 
Candidates seeking the approval of winemakers in southwestern France avowed that, 
“once taxes were removed from wine it would…become truly a drink of the masses; 
under their leadership, they proclaimed, both politics and wine consumption would 
become democratic.”81  The instrumentalist political motivation here is clear.  For one, 
the aim was to win over the masses with the promise of widespread “democratic” 
consumption.  Further, if this candidate were to win, winemakers would not only profit 
from tax reform, but also from greater demand for their product throughout the country.  
Essentially, this was a simple trade-off in which votes were exchanged for the promise of 
future profits. 
The Bordelais faced a changed political environment a few years later under 
Emperor Napoleon III.  The nature of political interaction during this timeframe had a 
familiar theme though.  When faced with the possibility of increased tariffs and taxes, 
winemakers leaned on rationale rooted in political and economic pragmatism.  It was of 
course appropriately adjusted for the intended audience.  In seeking special favors, the 
wine industry reasoned: 
Wine was a ‘tonic’ that workers required to bear up under the hardships of 
labor in factories where life was harsh, exhausting, destructive of a whole 
generation of France’s youth.  Viticulture, on the other hand, was 
healthful…when in prosperity growers could pay adequate wages, provide 
decent housing, and encourage high moral standards fostered by the old 
rural traditions preserved among landowners.  Agriculture of all kinds also 
made for a stable, obedient population.  It was certainly not vignerons who 
built barricades and overturned rulers.82 
It seems the Emperor was amenable to such reasoning.  To shore up the support of the 
Bordelais, he negotiated a treaty with the British that lightened the existing wine export 
burdens.  In addition, the retail sales tax on wine was reduced by fifteen percent and 
vineyard estate taxes were halved.83  This instrumentalist quid pro quo brought some 
stability and, in effect, loyalty to the regime was exchanged for some financial relief.   
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In year three of the Second Empire, Napoleon III asked the Bordeaux Chamber of 
Commerce to construct a classification system that would promote French wines in the 
1855 Exposition Universelle de Paris.  The task was then delegated to the brokers, whose 
product ranked the top sixty red wines based on selling price in just one of Bordeaux’s 
sub-regions, the Haut-Medoc. (A sixty-first wine from the Graves region, Chateau Haut-
Brion, was included as well; there was also a concurrent but less renowned classification 
of twenty-six dessert white wines from Sauternes-Barsac, which lies just to the south of 
Bordeaux).84  As for the rest of Bordeaux, its wines were not included because, sold 
generally within Europe, they fetched lower prices than those of the Haut-Medoc, which 
were by and large destined for the British market.85  These circumstances suggest that a 
simple rationalist desire to profit through exports explains the advent of the ranking 
system.  At the same time, the state of the market, in which Britons were willing to pay 
premiums for what they regarded as the best wines, suggests French wine was already 
regarded as a pinnacle of haute culture in key foreign markets.  It seems France 
understood this well at the time and, very rationally, seized on the idea as an opportunity 
for greater profits.  This externally derived conception of French culture had implications 
for the future as well.  Given a persistent demand for French goods like wine from 
Bordeaux, France would eventually come to understand part of its national identity, and 
thus part of its place in the world, in terms of its role as producer of culturally superior 
products.  
In terms of nineteenth century state involvement though, the endeavor was a 
fleeting one.  Two decades later, in the 1870s, the financial benefits of being ranked in 
the 1855 classification were nil.  Classified growth estates, the purported beneficiaries of 
the ranking, did not even band together to protect the system until after the turn of the 
century.86  This indicates that, in the nineteenth century, the classification was an 
extremely impotent form of state intervention.  In due course however, the classification 
would come to produce haute culture value in line with more powerful forms of 
protection. 
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E. FINDINGS 
Wine has always been an important part of French culture, and this examination 
of its nineteenth century history has affirmed that.  However, much of wine’s original 
association with identity was manipulated with purely economic purposes in mind.  
Indeed, evidence suggests that wine marketers, especially in Champagne, leveraged 
patrimonial sentiments precisely because they realized the conjured union, if actualized, 
was sure to increase sales outside the home region.  It was thus the marketing campaigns 
that, by evoking the tradition, history and natural character of the wine, gave wine much 
of its “Frenchness.”87   
The overall demand that was bolstered by such manipulations fueled the 
internationally based image of France as principal producer of luxury goods.  That this 
process was taking place during the age of nationalism and the development of national 
identities in Europe surely furthered the cultural ramifications on the domestic front.  
Since the global market for luxury goods was expanding during this era, it was the perfect 
time for these self-fulfilling instrumentalist mechanisms to take root.  As they did, more 
and more, France came to see itself with reference to its status as the home nation of 
haute culture.   
Therefore, it was via these two crucial ways that the broader link from French 
wine to national identity emerged.  That it emerged with such vigor supports the idea that 
even invented traditions can become very real.  Indeed the long-term implications would 
be many, as we will see. 
 
F. SUMMARY 
In Champagne, Bordeaux and nationally, the findings are similar.  Ties linking 
wine to broad notions of national culture were just beginning in the nineteenth century.  
Apart from that, even in the French wine regions most associated with national identity, 
manipulation was the primary foundation for wine having “Frenchness,” and it came in 
the form of invented pasts and imagined traditions.  As for the other aspects of political 
terroir, a culturally rooted desire to protect that which is traditional and natural was not 
present in the nineteenth century.  Nor was there a compelling desire to fight for variety 
                                                 
87 Phillips, 244. 
30 
in wine, as derived from such “prerogatives of place.”  By and large, today’s “politics of 
terroir” simply did not factor into the wine industry’s strategy to advance its position and 
protect its interests. 
The timeframe covered in this chapter witnessed mostly wine industry expansion 
and viticultural progress nationally—as well as in both Champagne and Bordeaux.  But 
fortunes took a severe turn for the worse with the breakout of phylloxera at the end of the 
nineteenth century.  According to Charles K. Warner, “It destroyed virtually the entire 
French vineyard.”88  Given wine’s political, cultural and economic value in France, the 
government in Paris would have no choice but to intervene. 
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III. THE ADVENT OF REGULATION: 1901 TO 1935  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The French wine industry did not fully recover from the upheaval caused by the 
phylloxera crises until after 1935, the year the national government passed a famously 
comprehensive regulatory reform package.  The law, which established the AOC 
administrative system, in time provided a level of protection sufficient enough to bring 
the wine sector some stability.  It did not come about easily.  Indeed, the years preceding 
1935 were turbulent ones for the French wine industry.  Generally speaking, disaffection 
among vignerons was widespread and, as a result, the French government was 
continually pressed to intervene.89  Two preliminary national level pieces of legislation 
were attempted, one in 1905 and one in 1919.  Neither was very successful and both were 
short-lived.  The 1935 law, on the other hand, was successful and enduring.   
The chapter that follows examines the political climate that prompted these three 
laws.  Throughout the chapter, the causal factors that encouraged initial regulatory steps 
are evaluated.  Instrumentalism, rooted in economic pragmatism and political 
expediency, is weighed alongside a culturally based explanation for the political will that 
fashioned French wine regulation in the early part of the twentieth century.  
The years covered in this section were, of course, not just tumultuous for the wine 
industry in Europe.  Section one, as it regards the motivations for the legislative 
protection of 1905, parallels the broader global shift away from liberalism taking place at 
the turn of the century.  Section two, addressing the political environment that provoked 
the law of 1919, takes place during an menacing backdrop in which European 
nationalism gained steam and national armies first mobilized, then slaughtered each other 
en masse.  The following section, the third, while focused on the rationale underpinning 
the seminal 1935 law, unfolds during a timeframe that saw the onset of Great Depression, 
the total breakdown of the liberal world order and the rise of Fascism in Europe. 
Before moving forward with the historical analysis, a qualifying point is 
necessary.  During the timeframe covered in this chapter, anti-fraud considerations 
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played an integral role in forming the wine laws passed by the national government.  
Unfortunately however, evaluating the motives driving the government to combat fraud 
can sometimes produce a degree of ambiguity.  This is so because pleas to counter 
fraudulent winemaking can in part be motivated by cultural factors, even when 
instrumentalist factors dominate the politicization of the issue.  In the case of the French 
wine industry, the rise in fraud in the early twentieth century significantly contributed to 
a flooded market that induced declining prices.  Because this situation left many wine 
farmers unable to earn a living, there was a powerful instrumentalist motivation to seek 
intervention.  Additionally, the existence of fraudulent wines on the market hurt the 
reputation of authentic, unadulterated wines, thereby furthering economic hardship.90  On 
the other hand, eschewing fraud in effect entails embracing a natural and often traditional 
expression of the product.  In this sense, it can be said that concepts akin to those of the 
hypothesized political terroir may have had a subtle hand in forming anti-fraud based 
legislation, even where the evidence might not overtly support such a claim.   
 
B. THE LAW OF 1905: COUNTERING FRAUD 
Although phylloxera was being held mostly in check in the opening years of the 
twentieth century, its repercussions were still palpable.  In an effort to swiftly reap the 
benefits of renewed plantings, vignerons tended to prefer quantity over quality and 
traditional winemaking methods.91  Together, the overproduction and resultant falling 
prices provoked seven years of crisis (1900-07) immediately after the turn of the century.  
A second key contributor to the troubles was widespread inauthentic winemaking and 
false labeling, which exacerbated the overproduction problem and thus the general 
economic downturn that plagued French vignerons.92  Scores of Frenchmen, almost the 
whole of the wine industry, felt the wrath of these deceptions—collectively known as la 
fraude.  In early twentieth century France, la fraude was understood as some kind of new 
phylloxera. 
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The problem of fraud was carried over from the previous century.  Due to their 
venerable and growing reputations, in the early twentieth century French wines were 
increasingly imitated in both domestic and foreign markets.93  For example, the makers 
of sparkling wine from the Loire region became notorious for bottling their product under 
the label “Champagne” at the turn of the century.94  Cheap, fruity wines from Algeria and 
France’s warmer southern regions were ever more frequently blended into Bordeaux and 
Burgundy wines to add structure in thin years.95  Additionally, wines were often heavily 
supplemented with beet alcohol, water or sugar.     
So as to correct the economic problems associated with market instability and 
fraudulent practices, and appease those affected, the national government set out to 
establish some form of protection for the whole of the French wine industry.  The decree 
of 1905 endeavored to guarantee the authenticity of a purchased wine under French law.  
That meant that a wine with the appellation “Champagne,” or “Bordeaux” or even “Midi” 
on the label was legally bound to the grapes planted in that respective region.  The 
historical record tells us that the law of 1905, like the more robust wine protection laws 
that would follow, was intended to protect both the producer and the consumer from 
fraudulent activities.96  In practice, the law would help the vignerons help themselves, 
which, in turn, would bring confidence to the consumer.   
With the authenticity of wine guaranteed, the legislators in Paris believed markets 
would recover and stabilize.  As for official accounts, the INAO asserts that in 1905 “the 
political powers in France, faced with increasingly intense growth of domestic and 
foreign trade and above all the almost total destruction of the country’s vines by 
phylloxera in 1870, decided to intervene.”97  This is in fact a very incomplete accounting 
of the causal factors in play.  For one, the wine industry had mostly recovered (by 
grafting French vines to North American rootstock) from phylloxera by 1905.  Secondly, 
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the expansion of trade bolstered demand for French wines—normally beneficial to the 
industry.  The real problem was that increased trade rendered fraud much more difficult 
to monitor and counteract.98  Nonetheless, the INAO’s version sheds some light on two 
important prerequisites to the fraud and falling prices that devastated French winemakers 
in the early twentieth century.    
But even according to the official line, it seems that early twentieth century 
French government forays into the wine market represent simple and practical 
interventions for rationalistic purposes.  From the perspective of the legislature in Paris, 
this was essentially an anti-fraud law whose purpose was to improve the plight of the 
troubled wine industry—a significant part of the overall French economy.  Thusly 
satisfied, this important sector would be unlikely to demand further political relief.  
Overall then, the assessment must me that political and economic considerations largely 
account for the law of 1905. 
In the evidence seen thus far then, indications of culturally motivated pressure for 
the law of 1905 are not appreciably present.  Yet because the law of 1905 was molded in 
part by the anti-fraud political movement, the presence of some culturally based 
inspiration cannot be ruled out.  In terms of effects, by creating what was merely a 
foundational link to the land, the measure did reinforce wine’s association with 
“Frenchness.”  More immediately however, this seminal intervention in the century’s first 
decade would prove too weak to be effective.  French winemakers were soon subjected to 
another hard turn for the worse.  Consequently, further protection was sought and, in turn, 
the national legislature repeatedly passed additional legal measures.  These efforts 
culminated with a watershed decree regarding Appellation d’Origine. 
  
C. THE LAW OF 1919: DEFINING THE AO 
 The 1919 law provided the first legal definition of an Appellation d’Origine (AO).  
It declared that “An Appellation d’Origine includes the name of a country, a region or an 
area serving to designate a product from that country, region or area, and with qualities 
and characters that exist due to the geographical environment, comprised of natural 
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factors and human factors.”99  Another critical aspect of the legislation is that it first 
allowed a collection of producers to own a place name.  Vignerons, instead of national 
administrators, were given the opportunity to define the appellation production zone, but 
only if their decisions could withstand judicial scrutiny.100  At the same time, the 1919 
legislation gave wine producers new legal venues through which to protest fraudulent 
winemaking practices.101  The ensuing paragraphs ask why this expansion was necessary 
and evaluate the political factors contributing to the passage of the law of 1919. 
 
1. Midi (Languedoc-Roussillon) 
One reason the law of 1905 failed was that it not go far enough to specify where 
and how boundaries were to be drawn.102  Corruption was present as well.  In the words 
of former INAO President Rene Renou, “…there were major conflicts of interest.  Some 
private individuals who had connections in Paris were able to secure the creation of 
appellations which were completely unjustified.”103  With enforcement proving difficult, 
la fraude continued almost unabated, compounding the enduring overproduction 
problem.  More accurately, it was the corollary of overproduction, retreating prices, 
which plagued vignerons throughout France.  The downward price trend was especially 
acute in the Midi, the region most exclusively devoted to the wine grape.  While price 
levels dropped lowest in the Midi, proportionate slumps were occurring throughout 
France.104  But it was the Midi that accounted for forty-two percent of all French wine at 
that time.  As well, the political circumstances of the Midi shed light on the early 
twentieth century interplay between cultural and more rationalistic appeals for protection 
against fraud.   
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That most winemakers committed fraudulent acts in the cellar, even as they 
decried the practice in public, lends credence to the idea that economic realities largely 
explain the actions of Midi vignerons after the turn of the century.  Charles Warner 
explains some of the rationale underpinning their duplicity: “It may have been a question 
of morality; but if one’s neighbor was making more money by dumping sugar in his 
wine, who wanted to be taken for a fool?”105  In the legitimate realm as well, the 
winemaking methods in the Midi expose the instrumentalist foundations of the 
overproduction problem.  In 1903 the total land under vine finally matched that seen 
before phylloxera, yet production had already surpassed pre-phylloxera output levels in 
1894.  Furthermore, during these years many Midi winemakers abandoned traditional 
grape varieties and started to irrigate and fertilize their vineyards, practices uniquely 
geared to increasing yields.  According to Historian Charles Warner, this “reflected a 
change in the winegrower’s attitude toward his product.”106  The inference is that the 
French vigneron did not take much pride in quality or the purity of the product during this 
timeframe.  This approach can also be seen, in part, as rational effort to make up for the 
losses of the phylloxera year.  
On the other hand, just a few years after 1905, ideas similar to contemporary 
political terroir started to surface in the Midi.  As the economic standing of Midi 
vignerons was still imperiled in the aftermath of the 1905 legislation, the Journal 
d’agriculture pratique implored: “If no one will promote the winegrowers’ interests—
then let them defend themselves.”107  They answered in 1907 by forming the C.G.V. 
(Confédération Générale des Vignerons du Midi), whose aims were exclusively focused 
on combating fraud.  In the organization’s founding statute, the objective was to pursue 
“Everything connected with the repression of fraud in winemaking in France, Algeria and 
the colonies, and with the study and defense of the viticultural, agricultural, economic, 
and social interests of its members.”108  While the language specifies the defense of 
economic interests, by mentioning viticultural and social matters, this passage signifies 
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that cultural factors were beginning to interact with the more instrumentalist factors.  In 
following up on the cultural rhetoric of its by-laws, the C.V.G. forced new members to 
promise to sell only natural wine.109   
Then again, it is revealing that overproduction went unmentioned in these 
founding statutes.  The omission indicates that vignerons were not interested in 
combating the flooding of markets as long as prices remained high.  With the upshot of 
high yields being thin, watery wines generally lower in quality, the case for a cultural 
influence is placed in doubt.  Moreover, the second main point of their organizational 
edict lends credence to the idea that the C.V.G. was primarily motivated by economic 
concerns.  It cites a key aspiration to “examine and propose all legislative or other 
reforms and all economic measures relative thereto, to support them before the public 
authorities, and to follow up their application.”110   
1907 also saw the wines of the Midi hit a price point that was equivalent to half 
the total cost of production.  La fraude was of course to blame.  Protesters took to the 
streets, with the crowds shouting “vive le vin naturel” and “down with the poisoners.”  
Yet, at the same time, many of these protesters were importing wine from Algeria to 
increase alcohol and body.111  In the summer, 300, 000 marched in Nimes; some 600,000 
did the same in Montpellier.112  Such was the perceived urgency of their grievances that 
the street riot became the preferred means of political expression. 
In an attempt to quell the uprisings, Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau 
deployed forces to the Midi and declared a national emergency.  To the apparent surprise 
of the military, the vignerons violently resisted their attempts to put down the 
demonstrations.  Five protestors were shot and killed, but the national forces ultimately 
lost the battle.  Since many were reservists originating from the Midi, the bloody 
encounter was too awful to swallow.  Whole platoons, and even one division, laid down 
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their arms.  The impasse forced the hand of the Prime Minister, who in turn acquiesced.  
Troops were ordered to pull out of the Midi, and the government declared it would devise 
a suitable resolution to the crisis.113 
Shortly thereafter, in September of 1907, the government promised the vignerons 
of the Midi fair prices for their grapes, and passed a law that defined wine exclusively as 
“the alcoholic fermentation of fresh grapes or of the juice of fresh grapes.”114  This move 
by the government placated the concerns over some forms of fraud, namely the use of 
beet juice, but failed to confront the continuing problem of overproduction.  Following 
that, and also in response to the riots, in August of 1908 the government “decreed that 
only wines originating in (the delimited) areas and made according to “local usage” and 
custom would henceforth be entitled to bear the area’s name on their labels.”115  The 
reference to local usage and custom seems to reflect a growing interest, by the 
government, in protecting prerogatives of place.  Even so, the historical justification 
provided by wine scholar Leo Loubere is that this law was above all “hoping to avoid the 
spread of violence to other areas.”116  That the government sought only to combat fraud, 
a popular stance, and not the other roots of overproduction, supports this allegation. 
In the end, it seems these lawmaking ventures were enacted mainly out of 
political necessity.  Had the vignerons of the Midi not taken to the streets and displayed 
such steadfast political resolve, the French government would, in all likelihood, not have 
ratified any protective measures at all.  Furthermore, without the demonstrated political 
will of the vignerons, in which la fraude was demonized, the government would not have 
stridently endorsed anti-fraud enforcement, which did eventually lead to some semblance 
of a recovery.117  The evidence in the Midi also suggests that early anti-fraud legislation 
only came about as a result of a price depression and the riots that followed.  Without 
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falling prices, anti-fraud riots would not have occurred.  In that event, the overproduction 
of adulterated and mass-produced wine devoid of “local usage and custom” would have 
continued.   
 
2. Champagne 
There is only one ethical Champagne, and that is produced in the 
appellation of  Champagne under the very specific regulations of the 
méthode champenoise.  Somehow, the chalk of the Champagne soils 
imparts an élan to “true” Champagne  that is not duplicated 
elsewhere in the world.118 
These are the words of geologist James E. Wilson in his book entitled Terroir.  
By way of the statement, a reader gets the impression that the hailed “ethical champagne” 
is easily defined by nature.  However, the history of delimitation was something 
altogether different.  Determining “ethical Champagne” was a difficult and controversial 
enterprise.  It became an onerous political problem, and even brought down two national 
governments.119  As was the case in the Midi, riots were the political tool of choice.  But 
what motivated the riots this time around?  And what was the rationale for the resultant 
political interventions? 
Imitating the trend in the Midi, grape prices in Champagne were in freefall during 
the first decade of the twentieth century.  Fraud, again like in the Midi, was a huge 
producer of surplus wine.  But unlike in the Midi, la fraude in Champagne was more 
singularly at the heart of the overproduction problem.  The use of new techniques to 
bolster output was not paralleled in Champagne.  As for the political favors won by the 
Midi vignerons, these, unfortunately for the Champenois, did not apply across the board.  
They did, however, take one particularly valuable political lesson from the Midi 
vignerons.  The lesson: “To change the law, they were going to have to break it.”120 
It should be noted before moving forward that, very much unlike the rest of 
France, the Champagne business was, and for the most part still is, dominated by large 
firms whose role in production was (and still is) to blend grapes from all over the region.  
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Given this role, it was historically easy for producers to infuse inauthentic grapes into the 
mix.  Vignerons (growers) were well aware of the practice.  Even during the height of 
phylloxera derived hardship in Champagne, the newspaper best representing the interests 
of the wine growers, La Révolution Champenois, reminded them that “phylloxera isn’t 
the only parasite in our vineyards,” alluding to the producers that corrupted their blends 
with grapes sourced elsewhere.121  The second critical divide in the region pitted the 
growers from the Department of the Marne and its surrounding regions, against the 
growers from the Aube region to the south.  The Marne growers, with the best soil and 
the key trade towns of Reims, Epernay and Ay, sought the exclusion of the “inferior” 
Aube grapes from the Champagne blends.122  The Aube growers, for their part, 
desperately clung to Champagne as if their lives depended on access to the 
designation.123  Because the city of Troyes, just to the south of the Aube vineyards, was 
the ancient capital of Champagne, the Aubois saw their inclusion into the appellation as a 
birthright. 
Given the developing seriousness of these fissures at the tail end of the decade, 
the regional political battle over the right to use the name Champagne could only be 
determined in Paris.  Even though the national government would have preferred to 
sidestep the controversy, the recent intervention in the Midi had set a precedent.  At any 
rate, the government’s initial attempt in 1908 to bring calm to Champagne proved to be a 
disaster.  With a few exceptions in the Aisne department to the immediate east, only the 
vineyards in the Department of the Marne were permitted to use the region’s name on a 
bottle of wine.  Predictably, the vignerons of the Aube were stunned, and even those in 
the Marne were displeased that Aisne vineyards were included.  On top of this, the 
harvest of 1909 was especially poor.  Then, 1910 turned out to be ninety six percent 
worse than that low point.  Consequently, the entire region found itself in an economic 
freefall.  Many in the government felt the region was on the brink of revolution.124   
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In January of 1911, the first stage of violence erupted in the village of Damery, 
just outside of Epernay.  Marching to the cry of “A bas les fraudeurs,” vignerons came 
across a cargo truck carrying wine from the Loire, its contents destined to be sold as 
Champagne by firms in Epernay.  The truck was destroyed and the wine was 
unceremoniously dumped into the Marne River.  In the fleeting violence that followed, 
the merchant houses were the key target.  Still, the government did very little.  When a 
national law was passed to strengthen the previous lawful exclusion of the Aube, the 
unrest reached new heights.125   
Thousands of Aubois vignerons soon took to the streets of Troyes.  The Aube was 
in a virtual state of insurrection, as “tax papers were burned, and government officials 
were hung in effigy.”  In Paris, the representatives from the Aube successfully blocked 
national governance by boycotting the annual budget.  As a result, the national 
government collapsed.  In April, a new government invalidated the 1908 law barring the 
vignerons of the Aube from making Champagne.  The Marne vignerons reacted by 
offering up their own state of insurrection, but this version was much worse than 
anything seen in Champagne to that point.  It was more like a civil war pitting vignerons 
against all comers, to include the government, the Aubois, the merchants and the 
producers.  Specific targets were wine and wine-related property.  The violence far 
surpassed that which had taken place in the Midi.126  With the situation deteriorating, the 
government decided to deploy thirty-five thousand troops in an effort to rein in the 
riots.127  But once again, the national soldiers would not aggressively take action against 
their fellow Frenchmen.  A second national cabinet fell immediately thereafter, and 
France searched for answers to the predicament in Champagne.  In the end, the riots were 
dramatic but short-lived, terminating in less than forty-eight hours.  Yet afterwards, the 
core issues dividing the region remained unsettled.128   
Much to the relief of the new government, the 1911 crop was a generous one.  
This served as a reprieve for the legislators in Paris, who took advantage by passing a 
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controversial law that split Champagne into two production zones.  Thenceforth, the 
Aube would use the label of Champagne-Deuxième Zone, or second zone.  To be certain, 
neither side was pleased with this compromise.  Nevertheless, some the underlying 
tension was mitigated and most overt demonstrations were called off.  In the years that 
followed, unrest simmered below the surface, never quite reverting back into violence.  
Hoping to avoid additional riots, some production firms began cooperating with the 
growers.  In doing so, they guaranteed a minimum price for grapes and instituted 
expanded anti-fraud measures.  Protests, if not full scale riots, continued throughout the 
Aube though.  Shockingly, some the Aubois went as far as to carry signs declaring their 
loyalty to Germany, much to the dismay of legislators in Paris.129  In view of the tension 
still present over the Champagne delineation, the government was, in a way, bailed out 
by onset of World War One.  In 1914, the ultimate determination on Champagne was 
tabled for another day.  
As was the case in the Midi, the political impetus for the intervention in 
Champagne was essentially rooted in political and economic realities.  Without fraud, 
prices would not have plummeted.  Without falling prices, the vignerons would not have 
rioted in the streets throughout the Champagne region.  Therefore, it was out of simple 
political necessity that the government reacted to this demonstration of the vignerons’ 
will.130  But again, the anti-fraud movement was in some measure formed by cultural 
factors like the oft stated intent to produce authentic, “true” Champagne.  Thus, it cannot 
be said that these government interventions were entirely driven by instrumentalist 
considerations, just mostly so. 
The economic turbulence that accompanied World War One severely impaired the 
business of wine.  The same was true of the French vineyard lands, many of which were 
literally trampled by soldiers and equipment.131  When the war ended in 1918, forty 
percent of the 1914 output had been lost.132  After the war, a very familiar tale of 
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production woes emerged.  In an effort to make up for lost time, vignerons replanted to a 
point that was incompatible with market capacity.  Fraud was not as much of a factor this 
time around; however, the overproduction problem reappeared just the same.  Given the 
obvious parallels, World War One can be regarded as the even newer phylloxera.  Amid 
this third massive wine market slump, and needing to address the traumas leftover from 
the pre-war riots, the French government was thrust into even more intense interaction 
with the wine industry.133  Central to this was the wine law of 1919, which amounted to 
another key step toward national regulation. 
Ultimately, the justice meted out under the law of 1919 was largely inconsistent, 
and verdicts regarding appellation were frequently tainted by corruption.134  This served 
to compound the postwar overproduction issue.  Additionally, in the aftermath of World 
War One, a general economic malaise hung over Europe, again undermining the stability 
of French wine markets.  One of Champagne’s chief markets, Russia, completely 
disappeared after its 1917 revolution.  Former economic powers Germany and Austria 
could no longer afford the luxury of French wine.  And soon enough, prohibition in the 
U.S. would take its toll on French wine sales.  This was all to be topped off by the Great 
Depression, perhaps the biggest phylloxera of them all.135   
As a consequence, French vignerons were ever more disgruntled in the face of 
volatile markets and the government’s apparent inability to effectively protect their basic 
needs.  Once again, the answer was expanded political protection.  To this end, an 
important law was passed in 1927, which first permitted production standards within each 
appellation.  It turned out to be one of the key foundations of the 1935 law.  The methods 
proposed by the appellations were still subject to judicial review, however.  Even with 
winemaking methodology now under a national regulatory umbrella, the judicial phase 
was doomed.  Ultimately, the countless claims, both for and against specific appellations, 
produced a general market confusion that made selling wines a difficult proposition.136 
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D. THE AOC REGULATORY SYSTEM OF 1935 
 In 1935 the French government renamed AO as AOC (Appellation d’Origine 
Contrôlée).  More significantly, after so many years of industry turmoil, it founded the 
CNAO (Comite National des Appellations d’Origine) which would become the INAO 
(Institut National des Appellations d’Origine) in 1947.137  This independent body under 
the Ministry of Agriculture was charged with the administration of the nation’s AOC 
system.  While it is the producers unions who propose new appellations and 
modifications to them, the INAO ultimately stood in judgment, as it does today.138  The 
founding decree effectively professionalized regulation of the French wine industry, 
bringing previously seen features—both legislative and legal—under one bureaucratic 
institution in Paris.139  After 1935, “no wine would qualify for AOC status unless it was 
made from specified grapes from a delimited area, and unless it conformed to the 
requirements considered appropriate to that wine type.”140 
In explaining the reasons for the AOC system, the INAO first mentions that it 
emerged “in the context of the deepest winegrowing crisis.”  While this is a dubious 
assertion considering the severity of the phylloxera crisis in the nineteenth century, it also 
suggests that the primary motivation for the intervention was of a practical nature.  But 
there is a second component to the official explanation.  Unlike the previous wine laws, 
under the 1935 system, “AOC products had to present particular characteristics due to 
natural and human factors.”141  This seems to indicate that “prerogatives of place” were 
alive and well in 1935.  But how well does the official explanation account for the 
entirety of the political logic underpinning the system?  
Leo Loubere tells us that the legislation leaned on the twin mechanisms of yield 
reduction and the distillation of surplus wine because winemakers wanted the 
government to strategically time the release of wine in synch with market demand.  He 
                                                 
137 Tim Unwin, Wine and the Vine (New York: Routledge, 1991), 316. 
138 Karen MacNeil, The Wine Bible (New York: Workman Publishing, 2001), 116. 
139 Institut National des Appellations d’Origine (INAO) website: 
http://www.inao.gouv.fr/public/home.php, accessed 29 December 2006. 
140 Phillips, 300. 
141 Institut National des Appellations d’Origine (INAO) website: 
http://www.inao.gouv.fr/public/home.php, accessed 29 December 2006. 
45 
proclaims that “From the most individualist to the most corporatist, such was the road 
along which necessity to survive was leading the vignerons and their political 
spokesmen.”142  Warren Moran, who postulates that the main purpose of the appellation 
was to garner higher rents, provides similar pragmatic rationale for the 1935 intervention.  
The explanatory logic is that regulation simply served as a control on supply.  Mr. Moran 
points to the example of Chateauneuf-du-Pape, the region which in 1923 showed the rest 
of France that limiting yields and concentrating on quality would bring top prices—even 
though growing conditions in that area were comparable to less prosperous neighboring 
Rhone Valley vineyard land.143  In garnering high prices through supply controls, 
producers were tapping into the previously “invented” idea that French wines and their 
inherent “Frenchness” carried exclusivity.  The practice, in all likelihood, naturally 
reinforced France’s own cultural identity as the ultimate source of haute culture via 
exclusive luxury goods.  The economic benefits of supply reduction, which catered to a 
market for products reflecting social status, were surely not lost on the producers in 
Chateauneuf-du-Pape.  In 1935, their model was for all intents and purposes borrowed by 
the national government, whose goal was to improve the economic plight of vignerons 
throughout the country.  So, generally speaking, with these points in mind, the advent of 
the 1935 regulatory system is attributed to instrumentalist motives.   
An appeal from the Champenois to Prime Minister Briand in December 1921 
appears to lend credence to a mostly economically driven rationalization of regulatory 
inception.  In an eleven page document, wine industry leaders, to include vignerons, 
producers and merchants, outline the dire economic circumstances then faced by the 
whole region.  What they sought was government backing for a stronger appellation, one 
that was empowered to enforce anti-fraud measures.  The document is identified as “an 
import and export product, providing a certain amount of taxes which could be of interest 
to the Secretary of Finance.”  In other words, if the government could help bail out the  
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Champenois, the national coffers stood to reap some of the rewards.144  Additional 
support for an economically based interpretation of events comes in the form an editorial 
appearing three weeks after the passage of the 30 July 1935 law.  In the trade journal Le 
Vigneron Champenois, Mr. George Chappaz, the publication’s Director, asserts that the 
law is “a great work which should treat all the big problems of the crisis hurting the 
French wine industry.”  Continuing on, he identifies the law as: 
a perfect example of managed economy, and we could almost write 
‘commanded economy’ because it (the decree) gives order to the wine 
producer, to save them instead of merely encouraging them to follow 
certain indications to  stabilize the market.145 
Yet even in the midst of these instrumentalist interpretations of the 1935 
regulation, the cultural impetus for intervention manages to make its presence felt.  As 
was noted previously, Warren Moran’s explanation of the 1935 law points to the 
precedent set by Chateauneuf-du-Pape’s 1923 appellation laws.  But at the same time, it 
was that same region that linking ideal grape varieties to specific terroirs first appeared in 
appellation laws.  In reference to the same law, Hugh Johnson reports that “just as 
important as the terroir were the cultural practices, the pruning, the maximum crop that 
would make good wine, the ripeness of the grapes, and the way they were handled in the 
cellar.”146  Also, in the aforementioned letter to the Prime Minister, the Champenios 
begin their petition for assistance by saying that they “fear the disappearance of a wine, 
which has exported the reputation of the French wine culture to the whole world.”147  
Lastly, in his editorial, Mr. Chappaz emphasizes that the 1935 law would succeed in part 
because it intended to control culturally motivated winemaking practices.  In none of 
these three examples did political terroir act as a primary rationale for intervention.  
Nevertheless, such nods to cultural factors were more noticeable than had been the case 
in the past.   
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Moving on, the final rationalization for the 1935 regulatory regime is centered on 
political instrumentalism in something of a top-down mold.  In a 2004 interview of 
recently deceased INAO President Rene Renou, Mr. Thierry Paul Leroux, a renowned 
wine writer and critic, offered this additional explanation.  Leading his interviewee 
towards the political realities of the time, he asked Mr. Renou if “the originality—one 
might say the trickery—of the 1935 law was therefore to create the INAO, an entity, 
which, theoretically, represented both the interests of the vintners and the interests of the 
government?,” to which the INAO President replied: “Exactly. (That) was the innovative 
aspect of it and it is not theoretical.”  Mr. Renou then goes on to cite la fraude as the key 
reason consumers and producers needed protection.148  As the interview progresses, the 
discourse sheds more light on the political situation in the early twentieth century.  
Having established that some twenty-five percent of voters were farmers in 1935 (as were 
forty to fifty percent in 1905), Mr. Leroux puts forth his own explanation of events:  
Considering that the appellation system was (set in motion) in 1905 when 
a lot of  people, if not the majority, were farmers and considering 
that the INAO was established in 1935 by a former Agricultural Minister 
after 30 years of the most violent farmer protests that the country had ever 
known, I have an idea.  What if the appellation system was established to 
get the farmers’ vote and what if the INAO was only created to end the 
civil unrest?149 
In response, Mr. Renou unequivocally rejects this theory.  However, the discussion that 
immediately follows Mr. Leroux’s proposed account validates the idea that the advent of 
the system was significantly shaped by practical political considerations: 
TPL: …couldn’t we say the system served an electoral purpose? 
RR: The government at the time probably cared about the welfare of what 
was an important segment of the population, both in terms of economic 
and voting power.  It is the same with every government.  More 
importantly, I think that the government wanted to control the vintners at a 
time when they were virtually out of control. 
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TPL: Aren’t we far from the idea that the appellation system was created 
to protect consumers? 
RR: The two ideas are not mutually exclusive. 150 
Ultimately then, the conclusion is that a combination of economic and political motives 
forced the establishment of the regulatory system of 1935.  Worth noting as well is that 
cultural motivations were not mentioned when this interview touched on the major 
foundations for this decisive intervention. 
 
E. FINDINGS 
Karen MacNeil writes: “France’s near obsession with geography (plus numerous 
episodes with fraud) resulted, in the 1930s, in the development of a detailed system of 
regulations known as the AOC.”151  The statement seems to emphasize the importance of 
terroir in establishing the regulatory regime, even at its outset.  But the evidence here 
indicates that such a description of the system’s birth is deficient.  Rather, it was 
fraudulent production and labeling that was far more critical to the founding of the AOC 
system.  La fraude, along with overproduction and externally induced market 
fluctuations, created the environment that brought forth an economic rationality for 
political intervention.  Just as importantly, if not more so, practical considerations by the 
politicians in Paris conditioned the initial inception of regulation. 
In the first section of this chapter, there was very little evidence indicating that 
cultural considerations were involved in the formation of the 1905 wine law.  When 
vignerons rioted in the Midi just a few years later, they protested the growing problem of 
fraud, possibly indicating a concern for the authenticity and natural aspects of their 
product.  It should also be inferred that the early existence of a market for non-fraudulent 
wines, on which producers were constantly tempted to capitalize, reveals that wine’s 
cultural value was already widely known.  At the same time, both the vignerons and the 
government consistently failed to address the concomitant overproduction problem.  
While it may be that the producers and their representatives simply failed to grasp the 
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realities of supply and demand, the government’s neglect on this front suggests the 
culturally based part of the anti-fraud formulations was somewhat disingenuous.   
In Champagne, on the heels of the protection granted to the vignerons of the Midi, 
vignerons looked to the national government to improve their own plight.  It was here, 
before World War One, that more valid cultural motivations for intervention started to 
round into form.  Cultural factors played an even larger role in the establishment of the 
watershed national legislation of 1935.  This was, however, still a small role relative to 
factors rooted in instrumentalism.  In any event, the conclusion is that political terroir 
was already ascending, albeit at a relatively slow pace, in the early twentieth century. 
 
F. SUMMARY 
From one instrumentalist angle, the regulatory system was created with political 
outcomes in mind, namely to get rioting wine farmers off the streets as the harsh effects 
of the Great Depression were hitting France in earnest.  A second instrumentalist account 
would attribute the advent of regulation to simple economic necessity.  This chapter has 
shown that both of these instrumentalist explanations are valid.  Indeed, economic and 
political expediency are the key factors in the establishment of the regulation system.  
But a third aspect, which may have been initially rooted in nineteenth century 
instrumentalism, also gradually emerged as a part of the political rationale for regulation 
in the early twentieth century.  This was a culturally based rationale for government 
intervention, the “politics of terroir.”  Ties linking wine to broad notions of national 
identity were really just beginning to be politicized.  The second aspect of political 
terroir was less politically significant however, as the desire to guarantee wine diversity 
is not evidenced.  But there is cultural salience to be found with regard to notions of time-
honored methodology and the natural places for French wine production.  Still, during the 
timeframe covered in this chapter, the evidence has shown that political appeals rooted in 
political and economic pragmatism were understood to carry more political weight than 
culturally motivated arguments.  As a result, these instrumentalist reasons are the primary 
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IV. ENDURING REGULATION: 1936-2007 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To mark the recent turn into the twenty-first century, the national government in 
Paris commissioned a vast poll asking the citizenry what most contributed to them being 
French.  As it turned out, the appreciation and understanding of “good” wine finished as 
the fourth most important aspect of “Frenchness.”  The only entries to surpass wine in 
impact on French identity were having been born there, upholding liberty as a civic 
responsibility and speaking the mother tongue.152  What explains this lofty cultural 
identity status?  As has been noted throughout this research, the link between wine and 
French identity has always existed.  But this, it would seem, is a level of cultural 
prominence not previously achieved.  The claim here is that the emergence of wine as an 
instrumental political and economic factor in the early twentieth century set in motion the 
forces that are responsible for this heightened cultural salience.  Accordingly, the chapter 
that follows explains how contemporary political terroir was brought into the cultural 
equation.   
The first section of this chapter shows how the effects of the 1935 law in 
particular, once set in motion, came to form the modern “politics of terroir.”  With this in 
mind, the second section of the chapter chronicles the rise of political terroir in the 
decades that followed, culminating at the end of the 1970s.  The third section introduces 
and defines the globalization that characterizes international wine markets today.  A 
fourth section then addresses the domestic issues that undermine the French wine 
industry and the politics that result from such challenges.  The fifth and final section 
analyzes the nature of France’s political reactions to the damaging effects of wine 
industry globalization.  Both of these final two sections illustrate how the connection 
between wine and French culture shapes a distinctive political environment that fiercely 
opposes rational market forces.   
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B. THE 1935 FALLOUT 
The AOC system that was established in 1935 has hardly changed since its 
inception.  Consequently, its influence has been both long-lived and profound.  The most 
important lasting consequence is that the legislation triggered a type of communal 
ownership of vineyard territory in France.  While pointing out the utilitarian motivations 
for the appellation system, then INAO President Rene Renou in 2005 explained the 
introduction of this innovative type of communalism:  
Since an appellation is a collective property, the dilemma was to find a 
way, through public law, to protect a district or a renowned wine region 
but without giving the authority (to) the parliament or to the courts…it 
was therefore decided to leave the creation and the management of 
appellations to those who knew it best, the vintners.153   
When subsequently asked if he thought the term “collective property” that he had used 
seemed at all frightening, Mr. Renou linked the idea to French identity.  His exact words 
were: “Since you are obviously uncomfortable with the wording, consider the appellation 
as part of the national heritage, much like historical monuments.”  This comment was 
made in recent years, after time had passed and the system had become embedded into 
the common cultural consciousness, so it cannot be regarded as indicative of cultural 
ideas in the 1930s and 40s.  It does, however, foreshadow the current connection between 
the AOC system and notions of French identity, a connection that developed in the years 
since 1935.  
But how exactly, then, did the AOC system produce the forces inherent to 
political terroir?  According to wine writer Andrew Jefford, an AOC belonged “in some 
cases to tens of thousands of individual wine growers.  It is a single name, often one that 
enjoys worldwide celebrity, which small scale, economically vulnerable individuals 
jointly own.”154  In the global wine trade, this place name soon became more 
recognizable and marketable than the name of the producer—except in the case of the 
most famous vineyards.155  As wine growers grew accustomed to selling their wine 
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according to place, over time they learned that their livelihoods depended on the 
collective reputation of that place.  To a great degree, the producers of wine were all in it 
together.  By founding the AOC system, the government institutionalized the social and 
cultural concept that a place could be something collectively held by those who worked 
the land.   
This form of communalism, under which the small grower had at least some 
control over production, halted the tide of what was becoming, prior to the advent of 
appellations, an ever more centralized, specialized and purely capitalist industry.  In one 
sense, the move to jointly own appellations was a compromise between the traditional 
individualism of the French farmer and the practical need to manage volatile markets 
through supply controls, which funneled benefits to a wider group.156  Sometimes the 
AOC derived collectivism would lead to the practice of unionism or syndicalism, but 
such was not always the case.  Even where unions were not present, a sense of shared 
ownership of the land and environment was pervasive.157 
In continuing his explanation of the communalism inherent to an AOC, Mr. 
Jefford reveals another notable offshoot of the system.  As a vigneron in a French 
appellation, you “struggle as far as possible to absent yourself from your wine.  Instead, 
you will try to express, above all, the characteristics of the land you tend for a short while 
but will leave to others after you.”158  To the degree that this statement accurately reflects 
winemaking principles in France, the inception of the AOC system gives explanation to 
the contemporary duty to express terroirs through time-honored local techniques, and in 
the most natural light possible.  In such a mindset, yielding to the intrinsic characteristics 
of the terroir becomes a prerogative of the community, its collective past and the 
established relationship with the natural environment.  Leaning on these ideas, prominent 
wine author and importer Kermit Lynch asserts that, “the system of AOC is not a rating, 
not a judgment of the wine in bottle, but a definition of the terrain, the soil, the grape 
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varieties…the raw materials.”159  This passage only speaks to AOC as it does or does not 
relate to neighboring terrain.  But if he were to endeavor a more complete explanation of 
an AOC, it seems Mr. Lynch would only have to add that an AOC is also an expression 
of the traditions a given winemaking community brings to the land. 
In contrast to the communalism and public ownership enshrined in the AOC 
system, outside of France private interests and brands would soon come to dominate wine 
markets.  Because the establishment of the AOC system precluded domination of wine 
production by private interests, France steered away from the sameness and dependability 
of a brand, which, as it happens, is a common aim of larger private corporations.  Owing 
mostly to its semi-public nature, the wine system in France instead produced just the 
opposite.  Once again, Mr. Jefford best describes what would come to be enduring 
contrasts between France and those who instead chose the brand model of production:  
“The flavour of a brand is engineered for maximum consumer appeal; the flavour of 
appellation wines is derived, as limpidly as possible, from the realities of site and 
season.”160  These realities of site and season are the variations which give rise to 
individuality and diversity.  It is in exactly this way that another important legacy of the 
AOC system materializes.  This is the political terroir sense in France that preserving end 
product variety has become a national responsibility.    
So, in summary, the partial communalism of the system produced wine diversity, 
a concept that over time came to hold identity and cultural connotations.  Therefore, part 
two of the “politics of terroir,” variety, is essentially a by-product of the 1935 AOC 
system.   The public nature of the AOC also permanently fixed traditional and natural 
winemaking as social practice with concomitant cultural clout.  But it cannot be said that 
part three of political terroir, which involves ideas advocating natural and traditional 
methods, is singularly tied to the AOC system.  These aspects were to some extent 
present previously, as we have seen; still, the law of 1935 permanently entrenched such 
ideas in French culture.   
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C. WINE ON THE NATIONAL SCENE: AS TIME WENT BY 
Referencing the status of wine and wheat in the 1930s, Historian Robert O. 
Paxton states that “the production of these two crops affected so many French families 
that many… called them “electoral crops”: their fate got politicians elected and 
governments overthrown, and they could not be ignored.”161  In 1935, there were 
approximately 41.5 million people in France, and around 10 million voters were farmers.  
One in six families was economically dependent on the wine industry.162  These 
demographic realities, coupled with empirical evidence, significantly influenced an 
electoral-political justification for the beginnings of regulation in the previous chapter.  
But as time passed, the demographics changed, as did the political motivation for 
sustained protection.   
Today, the French wine industry employs some three hundred thousand men and 
women in a nation of just over 60 million.  Only about 3 to 4 percent of the population 
works in any type of agricultural endeavor.  As such, electoral strength alone cannot drive 
the politics of AOC protection.  The idea that regulation persists because the government 
is specifically targeting the votes of vignerons is absurd.  As compared to the 1930s, the 
wine sector and other farming interests now constitute a very small portion of national 
economic output.  And in fact, many observers claim that the continued protection of 
wine comes at the expense of more productive industries.  This, in turn, negatively 
impacts overall economic output.  Given these economic and electoral realities, policies 
that promote the continued protection of wine could even be said to be detrimental to 
political survival.  That is, such would be the reality if it were not for the political weight 
of wine as a cultural concept. 
In the decades of recovery immediately following World War Two, France was 
becoming an increasingly urban and industrialized nation.  Yet in 1957, some 1.5 million 
Frenchmen were somehow still engaged in wine production, about 94 percent of which 
were small producers (equating to less than 100 hectoliters annual production).  For a 
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nation of about 43 million at that time, this meant the wine producers remained a potent 
electoral demographic.  Accordingly, practical considerations likely remained as the 
primary rationale for keeping regulation in place in the 1950s.   
During the 1940s and 50s, the second order effects of the AOC system, as 
mentioned in the previous section, were gradually embedding themselves on the French 
political landscape.  By the late 1950s, various attacks on the government’s alleged 
coddling of the industry were vigorously defended with counter charges labeling such 
accusations as evidence of a foreign conspiracy.  The wine industry rejoinders took aim 
at transnational companies, whose frequent rejections of wine protection were labeled a 
debasement of “French mores and customs.”163  Furthermore, throughout the 1950s, 
factional national cabinets were often held together only due to unanimous support for 
the cultural idea of “traditional France.”  This meant the wine industry retained 
unequivocal political favor, even in the face of arguments pinpointing wine protection as 
a drain on the national economy.164  At the time, wine was widely regarded as the 
“spoiled child” of an already pampered French agricultural sector.165   
The French wine regulatory regime was internationalized in the 1950s.  This, too, 
had, second order effects.  Given its success in bringing stability in the face of volatile 
international markets, the central tenets of the appellation concept were folded into the 
European Economic Community’s (EEC) governmental framework in 1957.  The export 
of this French-invented system had lasting impact in France.  As it was closely aligned 
with wine, and hence notions of national identity as well, the propagation of the AOC 
system gives some explanation as to why the AOC system itself came to be linked with 
broader ideas of “Frenchness.”  
For the French wine industry, the key political economy feature of the 1970s was 
the establishment of numerous AOCs without regard for exacting quality standards.166  
On the surface, this actuality appears antithetical to the existence of a terroir based 
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cultural politics.  But a closer look at the nature of appellations reveals some complexity 
regarding the relationship between wine quality and political terroir.  The interview of 
former INAO President Rene Renou sheds some light on the issue.  After Mr. Renou 
affirms that an AOC is not a guarantee of quality, the question arises:   
TPL: …you are well aware that for some consumers an appellation is also 
a synonym of quality.  Are you saying that we should tell these consumers 
that they are wrong? 
Rene Renou: The foundation of an appellation, its reason for being, is an 
intimate tie to a place of origin.  The result of this relationship is that a 
wine coming from a particular place cannot be duplicated elsewhere.  
That’s it; it is not something else.  The rules that wine producers must 
follow, however, and which are spelled out in the appellation decrees, 
should result in quality…logically.167 
As Mr. Renou lays out his expectations for a logically functioning AOC system, the 
problem of quality presents itself.  Most fundamental here is that quality considerations 
were not a part of the AOC system as it was legislated in 1935.  Still, France’s best wines 
were AOC wines in the 1970s, as they were in 1935 and even today.  Most appellations 
did in fact have the exacting production standards that generally, and logically, resulted 
in quality.  So it was assumed by many consumers that quality was a function of the AOC 
system.  However, since quality was not really a legal prerequisite for an AOC, it was 
entirely possible for a locality with poor growing conditions and poor production 
standards to apply for and establish an appellation.  Many regions exploited this loophole 
and were soon successfully selling what was perceived to be quality wine.  Of the almost 
500 appellations today, many of the poorest in quality were created in the 1970s, and into 
the early 1980s, when, quite simply, it was economically feasible to do so.168  Even the 
INAO President, Mr. Renou, admitted as much in 2005.169  That these appellations were 
established suggests that quality, for its part, was not part of the cultural equation that 
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sought political protection in the 1970s.  The inception of so many substandard  
appellations during these years would later have profound implications for how the 
French would look to market wine. 
The watershed event of the 1970s for the global wine industry was the Paris 
tasting of 1976.  Although it was not political in nature, it would later have political 
implications for France.  The occasion pitted twelve top caliber Californian wines, six red 
and six white, against four grand cru reds from Bordeaux and four renowned whites from 
Burgundy.  In what was a surprise to most wine industry observers at the time, the 
American wines fared very well overall, and even claimed the best wine in each category.  
The outcome foretold, and may have contributed to, the onset of a very different 
international market in which wines from outside of Europe could compete with their 
more prestigious Old World and French counterparts.   
Unlike French wines, the new foreign competitors were not irrevocably and 
legally tied to a specific plot of land.  As Elin McCoy puts it, “The Paris Tasting was the 
first step in unhinging wine from place.”  Until this brief moment in 1976, French wine 
“had never been about just taste, or who won a comparative tasting; it was about history, 
part of a way of eating and living, part of, well, being French.”170  Soon enough, the 
French would have to make some difficult choices.  Would they try to maintain control 
over something regarded as a product of their unique history and culture, or would they 
allow wine to be simply about taste and market driven demand?   
   
D. CONTEMPORARY GLOBALIZATION AND FRENCH WINE 
According to former World Bank Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz, globalization 
is “the removal of barriers to free trade and the closer integration of national 
economies.”171  In the world of wine, however, this definition conveys only some of the 
global dimensions in play.  Beyond reduced barriers and cross-border economic 
convergence, the globalization of wine also involves concurrent consumption and 
production revolutions.  Countries like China, Japan, India, and Russia are buying more 
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wine than ever before.  At the same time, production is increasing at a rapid pace in 
Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and even China.  While consumers are 
increasingly refining and expanding their palates, producers constantly encounter, and 
often employ, new viticultural technologies and techniques.   
Just as is the case with standard versions of globalization, a deep divide exists in 
the world of wine.  Whereas many economic globalization stories observe a divergence 
between the material haves and the have-nots among nation states, in wine the fault lines 
are with regard to style and the expression of terroir.  Usually hailing from outside 
Europe, the New World style of wine typically means high alcohol, deep concentration 
(also termed highly extracted), oaky flavors and fruitiness at the front of the palate.  
These wines are usually constructed with a big boost from technology and laboratory 
analysis.  On the other side of the coin is the Old World style, which is epitomized by the 
prerogatives of place inherent to French winemaking.  (In terms of style, European 
winemaking is generally more traditional and natural than the New World, but France is 
by far the most uncompromising example of the Old World style).  Terms normally used 
to describe Old World wines include subtle, elegant, food-friendly and earthy.172   
It was in the 1980s that the wine business began to globalize at an accelerated 
pace.  The exact date is of course murky, but around 1985 the French wine industry 
started to feel the impact of global competition.  Prior to that, for the most part France 
had dominated global wine markets.  But, as was foreshadowed by the Paris Tasting of 
1976, global demand began to change gradually in the eighties.  By the mid-nineties, the 
majority of global markets preferred New World (or “internationally”) styled wines.  
These wines came with new marketing and production models; they were devoid of 
tradition, mostly ignored any link to specific terroirs, and, in general, shunned the 
desirability of diversity.   
 
1. Domestic Concerns 
Before digging further into the nature of the contemporary French resistance to 
globalization, a few domestic problems should be addressed.  To start, consumption of 
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wine in France has decreased by fifty percent over the last twenty years.173  This trend, 
for which younger generations are mostly responsible, continues to this day.  Imbibers 
are instead opting for carbonated beverages and beer.174  Politically, new laws are forcing 
the police to crack down on driving under the influence, and as a consequence, even the 
dedicated wine consumer, tending as he does to frequent restaurants, is cutting back.  
Also impacting French wine is the Evin Law of 1991, which prohibits alcohol advertising 
on national television in an effort to curb alcoholism.   
But how does the French wine industry respond to these domestic challenges?  In 
short, it puts the cultural salience of its product on trial in public forums, thereby 
guaranteeing some political reaction.  Regarding the anti-alcoholism measures, the wine 
industry recognizes that the social problems associated with alcohol need to be 
curtailed.175  At the same time, however, the wine lobby openly taps into political terroir 
in an effort to minimize the degree to which it is affected by this type of legislation.  
Responding to Evin’s law and driving under the influence legislation, the wine industry 
protests the lack of legal distinction between wine and other alcoholic beverages.  Jean-
Louis Vezien, the Director of the CIVA (Confédération Interprofessionnel du Vin 
d’Alsace), Alsace’s official trade group, states that “(Wine) has returned to its proper 
place in the gastronomic world of good taste.  Wine causes less road accidents than 
youngsters who drive after coming out of clubs.  There is a cultural issue here…”176  The 
point advocates like Mr. Vezien are stressing is that, in accordance with French cultural 
norms and societal standards, wine tends to be paired with food and consumed in 
moderation.177   
In 2004, Minister of Agriculture Herve Gaymard replied to such pleas by 
promising slight changes “without demonizing a product that forms part of our cultural 
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heritage.”178  In February of 2007, Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy, then the leading candidate for 
President, promised to relax the advertising restrictions as prescribed by Evin’s law, 
should he be elected that coming May.  The language he used is revealing.  He told a 
group of winemakers “Wine is not just an economic activity, it’s a French tradition, a 
French identity, a French know-how.”179  It should not be surprising that Mr. Sarkozy 
clearly understood the cultural salience and political power of French wine, even though 
he himself is a teetotaler.  In France, it is essential that a candidate for national office 
appreciate the culturally based political power of wine. 
  
2. Resistance to Globalization 
This section that follows covers some of the externally driven challenges and 
criticisms confronting French wine today, as well as the nature of the resulting political 
backlash.  A contrast to this state of affairs will then be drawn by way of an examination 
of contemporary Champagne.  As has been touched on previously, Champagne produces 
wine under a completely different regulatory environment than is the case elsewhere in 
France.  This reality has profound implications for the manner in which the region 
communicates political terroir.   
 
a. The Problem of Shifting Demand 
Wine industry observers posit that approximately ninety percent of global 
wine markets now subscribe to an “Anglo-American” perspective, which equates to a 
preference for the international or New World style of wine.  Comments by Rene Renou 
epitomize how the French view this divergence in perspective.  It is very much a defense 
of the way the French value wine.  He states that:  
There is the French…perspective that considers that terroir, and the 
association of a grape variety with a terroir, have an influence on the 
organoleptic qualities of wine.  Whether it’s true or not is irrelevant, it is 
something that we strongly believe…On the other hand for Texas Bill or 
Australia Jack, wine is a simple pleasure, it’s all about grape varieties and 
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a technology that must be used to highlight the organoleptic qualities of 
the varietals. To use an example, I would say that some people like 
classical music, others prefer pop music.”180   
The reference to classical music, coupled with the labeling of New World wines as 
“simple,” is an unmistakable sign that France views its wine as having social pedigree in 
line with the hypothesized political terroir.  Other elements of wine’s cultural salience, 
such as the link to natural terroir expression, are evidenced here as well. 
But how does the “Anglo-American” perspective hold sway over so much 
global demand today?  One reason is based on simple demographics.  Consumers outside 
of Europe are ever more numerous.  In traditional wine drinking nations like France, 
however, fewer and fewer people consume wine every day.  In addition to this 
consumption transformation, powerful critics such as Robert Parker, Jr. of The Wine 
Advocate and James Suckling of The Wine Spectator have seen their influence grow to 
the point that they are now compelling producers to make wine in the New World, 
international flavor profile—even if they do so inadvertently at times.  Emerging markets, 
especially, look to critics to guide their purchases.  As wine tends to be seen by the 
novice as complicated and intimidating, experts often help guide initial purchases.  Also, 
a wine recommended by a noteworthy critic usually holds its value or appreciates as it 
ages.  This variable is known to motivate the purchases of investors in Asia and other 
newer wine markets.  Not surprisingly, the most reliable experts when it comes to 
investment value are those that have influence over the largest markets, which happen to 
be America and England.  Thus, Anglo-American critics and the Anglo-American 
perspective gain more influence over global wine demand with the appearance of every 
emerging market.  It was via this dynamic that most consumers came to view wine 
through an Anglo-American lens.   
In today’s global marketplace, producers have a powerful financial 
incentive to fashion their wines in a style most likely to please these critics.181  Indeed, 
doing so easily translates into massive profit increases, almost without fail.  Wine 
industry analysts, as well as producers, take for granted the fact that the most powerful 
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“Anglo-American” wine writers favor fruity, concentrated wines over the lithe and 
elegant ones that typify traditional French winemaking.182  As a result, some Old World 
producers comply and make internationally styled wines, even in France.  After all, a 
high rating from a key reviewer can mean survival, or even prosperity, when bankruptcy 
might have otherwise been a possibility.  In her book entitled The Emperor of Wine: The 
Rise of Robert M. Parker, Jr. and the Reign of American Taste, Elin McCoy identifies 
Mr. Parker as 
the most powerful critic in any field, period.  If a New York film critic 
pans or praises a film he may influence its reception in that city, but his 
view won’t have the same effect on moviegoers in Paris or Tokyo, nor will 
film directors around the world create movies to appeal directly to his 
taste.183   
Still, many vignerons refuse to surrender to the tide of these market forces.  
They do so because, for the French, altering the manner in which wine is made, means 
altering a degree of “Frenchness.”  Indeed, belligerence to the demands of the market is 
rooted in the cultural factors that comprise the “politics of terroir”.  As early as the mid-
1990s, one of Mr. Parker’s tasting facilitators in France lamented, “why must I submit 
everything I do to one person to be judged?  Should I show all the wines or just show 
those I know he would like, even if Burgundy (represents) diversity and 
individuality?”184  A chateau owner in Bordeaux, faced with the opportunity to 
participate in a tasting for Mr. Parker, declined, saying “To be part of Parker’s big 
competition to find the biggest (wine), the most color, the most fat—no, I don’t want to 
do that.”185 
 
b. The Problem of Rigidity 
A common criticism of the AOC system is that its myriad rules prop up 
average winemaking while stifling the prospects of inspired or innovative vignerons.  
This charge has validity in the sense that winemakers in a given AOC are generally not 
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allowed to experiment with new grapes or methodologies.  Outside of France, wine 
producers are far more able to experiment with new technologies and techniques, which 
make them more competitive in markets that demand cutting edge winemaking.  The 
AOC system, on the other hand, preserves the prerogatives of place and diversity at the 
expense of this flexibility and openness to innovation.  As well, AOC-derived 
communalism props up the small grower, in turn countering the consolidation of wine 
production by larger firms that might have the capital to infuse new methodologies most 
efficiently into viticulture.  
But how do the French defend the inflexibility of the system?  In 2005, 
Rene Renou began a rejoinder by saying that “you can always find a few people who 
criticize the appellation system, but vintners do not challenge the concept of appellation 
itself.”186  This is the case not only because the AOC system yields diversity, and 
guarantees natural and traditional winemaking, but also because France has come to 
embrace the AOC system itself as a cultural icon.  Mr. Renou’s suggested fix for French 
wine is to create a sort of super AOC, with the designation Excellence marking the 
terroirs best suited to produce quality wines.  He would prefer to revoke certain AOCs 
and tighten standards across the board, but under French law, it is impossible to remove 
an AOC from the system.  For those not fit for the proposed AOCE (Appellation 
d’Origine Contrôlée d’Excellence) level, he says, “The part of culture, history, dream and 
the tie to terroir would hence no longer be required.”  Mr. Renou’s theoretical system has 
died on the vine since being proposed, but his description of today’s worthy AOCs 
elucidates how the French view their wines.187   
Related to the inflexibility charge is the assertion that AOCs are 
determined by the producers’ prerogatives rather than consumer demand.  In other words, 
if the buyers want mostly Cabernet Sauvignon and Chardonnay in a fruit forward style, 
then France should adapt accordingly much as the rest of the world has done.  If France 
refuses, it is no wonder that large segments of the wine industry struggle to survive.  Yet 
France continues to resist.  When asked in an interview what would become of French 
wine if the AOC system were dismantled, INAO Senior Technical Analyst Francois 
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Roncin lamented that all wines would end up as either Cabernet Sauvignon or 
Chardonnay, with labels indicating the varietals, and with big companies growing ever 
more dominant.188  In saying this, he gives voice to the culturally based fear that variety 
and the small grower might be destroyed, lest they live up to their national responsibility 
and preserve such conditions.   
Michel Leguay, Technical Director at Viniflor (Office National 
Interprofessionnel des Fruits, des Légumes, des Vins et de l’Horticulture), responded to 
the same question by leaning on another piece of the cultural equation that underpins the 
system.  He asserts that dismantling the AOCs would, in effect, be a denial of the “real 
connection of a product with its terroir.”  Furthermore, he postulates that a departure 
from the AOC concept would be received with incomprehension among the informed.  
Those unaware of the system’s output and link to culture would likely remain indifferent, 
according to M. Leguay.189  But, in France, where knowing and understanding good wine 
is the fourth most important aspect of identity, the outrage would no doubt be 
considerable.  
   
3. Champagne 
A competitor in the gourmet coffee market recently compared his brew to an 
exclusive Champagne or perfume, saying: "We are consistent in taste, like Champagne, 
whose secret is consistency."190  It is this consistency that, more than anything else, 
differentiates Champagne from the rest of French winemaking, which is set up to produce 
a competing virtue, that of variety as derived from diversity of place.  Consistency also 
makes Champagne the region that produces wine most like that of a brand.  This quality 
goes a long way to explain Champagne’s success in today’s global marketplace, where 
the brands of Champagne are its large firms, Moet, Veuve Clicquot, Mumm and the like.  
The marketed variety is not a grape; rather, due to consistency that approximates a 
variety, it is the Champagne appellation itself.  What, then, explains this consistency, and 
what does it mean for political terroir?   
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In 1927, for mainly political reasons, a very broad appellation zone was drawn to 
include the vignerons in the Aube.  This AOC was later validated under the AOC laws of 
1935.  Unlike in the rest of France, no sub-appellations were delineated.  As was pointed 
out earlier in the chapter, the communalism inherent to an appellation in effect counters 
privatization, consistency and more streamlined production.  Even though every specific 
plot of land has a specific terroir and therefore can in theory produce a unique wine, an 
AOC decree engenders a certain degree of sameness throughout each appellation.  After 
all, every wine in a given AOC must adhere to a common local tradition and a relatively 
common natural environment.  So it stands to reason that if Bordeaux has 57 appellation 
decrees and Champagne has but one, more variety will be produced in Bordeaux than in 
Champagne. 
The Champagne appellation decrees of the early twentieth century also enshrined 
then traditional “local usage” practices, which meant blending wines from multiple 
vintages and multiple terroirs.  Codifying traditional blending techniques, coupled with 
the maintenance of a large production zone, also necessitated the continued role of large 
firms.  Only they had the capital and infrastructure to purchase, age and mix wines from 
multiple vintages.  And only they had the established business relationships that could 
facilitate the sourcing of grapes from across the large appellation zone.  Together, these 
two blending techniques further guaranteed wine uniformity in the bottle.  This sameness 
was clearly in the interest of the large firm, whose customers already sought a brand-like 
consistency to their Champagne even prior to the onset of national regulation.  By 
contrast, the small grower needed to sell his harvest every year to subsist, and surely 
lacked the means to store wines from multiple vintages.  In this way, the large firms 
served a very practical purpose from the vantage point of the vigneron.  At any rate, as a 
result of the perseverance of large firms, the practice of blending and the extensive 
production zone, the second part of the political terroir formula, variety, is limited in 
Champagne. 
Regarding the third part of the “politics of terroir”, the desire to protect traditional 
and natural winemaking, the wine production conditions in Champagne again dictates a 
divergence from the politicized cultural environment seen elsewhere in France.  To begin 
with, the traditional style of Champagne is not really threatened by consumption patterns, 
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as is the case with other French wines.  Because Champagne already possesses a brand-
like reliability, the style induced by its traditional winemaking methodology remains in 
high demand.  Perhaps even more crucial is that the outside world lacks a viable 
competitor when it comes to the social cachet unique to Champagne.  In terms of a 
cultural motive to allow terroir to be expressed as naturally as possible, this too has very 
limited salience in Champagne.  It is revealing that in its promotional pamphlet, entitled 
“Welcome to the wines of Champagne,” the Comite Interprofessionnel du Vin de 
Champagne declares that Champagne wines are born in the cellars…”191  Elsewhere in 
France, and leaning specifically on the natural prerogatives of place, wines are always 
said to be born in the vineyard.  The notion that wine should naturally communicate its 
terroir is further undermined in Champagne because blending lends itself human 
intervention, which is less natural in the first place.   
The state of production in modern Champagne is therefore a testament to the 
enduring criticality of the 1935 regulatory legislation.  The enshrinement of a large 
production zone, along with the practice of blending, yielded a different brand of 
communalism, one that positioned Champagne for success in a globalized market that 
demanded consistency.  At the same time, the distinctive communalism practiced in 
Champagne effectively blunted significant aspects of the political terroir formula.  Then 
again, some contemporary Champagne producers are now making wines that endeavor to 
portray place in a more natural, hands-off fashion.  The recent appearance of this small 
scale, cutting edge production hints that, even in Champagne, the cultural terroir factor 
may be on the rise today.  Still, these avant-garde producers remain constrained by the 
méthode champenois, which by definition involves an interventionist, hands-on approach 
to wine-making.  
In sum, and mirroring the tactic used on the domestic front, the evidence has 
shown that French wine responds to potentially damaging international forces with a 
form of political rhetoric that is increasingly colored by cultural factors.  The state of 
affairs in Champagne, on the other hand, proves that political terroir is not consistent 
across the French wine landscape.  Large appellations and the practice of blending by 
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large firms in Champagne were, and continue to be, atypical to the French wine industry.  
The consistency rendered by these conditions in Champagne ultimately results in less 
variety when compared with the rest of France.  Champagne’s unique structures account 
for its modern success, as well as the absence of certain forms of political terroir.  The 
foundations for Champagne’s success in contemporary global wine markets will help 




The step toward communalism inherent to the AOC system may have been 
partially rooted in already existing culturally based notions.  But, in the main, the move 
was driven by the political and economic pragmatism of the 1930s.  Thus the first cultural 
derivative of communalism, product diversity, was originally based in instrumentalist 
tendencies.  The same is mostly true for the desire to protect natural and traditional 
winemaking methodology, ideas that were buttressed a great deal by the move to 
collectively owned vineyards.  Later, however, all three of these cultural derivatives of 
the 1935 AOC system would become politicized.  As a result, it can be said that modern 
political terroir is firmly rooted in the inception of the regulatory regime of 1935. 
Rather than submit to market forces that would otherwise have led to production 
dominated by brand-like wines, the French chose to cling to the idea that traditional, 
natural and diverse wines were quintessentially French and thus warranted protection.  As 
well, the AOC regulatory system itself would, in time, become embedded into broader 
perceptions of French identity.  With reference to the more generic identity link, its 
presence was felt even before 1935.  Yet it, like the other concepts inclusive to political 
terroir, reached new heights in the latter half of the twentieth century.  In the present era 
of globalization, these culturally based factors play a substantial role in the political 
impetus underpinning the enduring French regulatory regime. 
  
F. SUMMARY 
Since the inception of the AOC system in 1935, the clout of political terroir has 
trended significantly upward, even compared to the rise seen in the first decades of the 
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twentieth century.  As the modern thrust of globalization progresses today, the “politics 
of terroir” keep the French regulatory system afloat, despite rational economic forces that 
would otherwise lead to its demise.  Such is the case in large part because the 1935 wine 
regulation laws spurred a type of collectivism that produced powerful side-effects, 
namely diversity of production style and a national insistence on the “prerogatives of 
place.”  Over time, these secondary effects deeply embedded themselves into broader 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Daniel Berger, a wine marketer in Paris, captures much of the French dilemma 
over wine in saying “We are now at a critical point…We run the risk of seeing our 
infinite diversity give way to chemical processes.”  Following up on that thought, he 
wonders “Will we see the small producers in [Europe] stand by and watch the “death of 
real wine” in favor of beverages lacking all humanity?”192  Indeed, what is at stake for 
the French is the future of “real” wines, wines driven by tradition and nature, wines that 
have historically communicated an inestimable diversity of style.  These real wines, 
which have come to bestow an air of status and haute culture on the imbiber, have even 
more resonance today because they, and the AOC system that brought them, are an 
increasingly cherished reflection of what it means to be French.  
As for the mention of a “chemical process” and competing “beverages lacking all 
humanity,” such disparagement is a typical way of framing the ills of contemporary 
globalization, especially in the agricultural sectors of the West.  And yet the national 
political salience of this rhetoric is undeniable.  In France, wine’s cultural value, 
identified here as the “politics of terroir,” produces the protection that is realized mainly 
via the AOC regulatory system.  In other countries, and in other sectors, entirely different 
modes of protection emerge to thwart liberal markets that are thought to give way to 
functional but cultureless products, many of which would similarly earn the label as 
“lacking all humanity.”  The rise of political terroir as chronicled in this paper illustrates 
how and why such seemingly irrational anti-liberal sentiment can come to play an 
important role in national politics.   
Moreover, the national trade policies that derive from this type of cultural politics 
often impact the global economy and its institutions.  As was established in the 
introduction section, imperiled Western and European agricultural products, one of which 
is French wine, presently play a key role impeding global free trade.  As such, their 
importance for global economic and political harmony should not be underestimated.  
Still, the political history of French wine tells us that some products, along with their 
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attendant models of organization and production, can become deeply embedded in 
national identity, thereby making resistance to change especially fierce.  Indeed, this 
account affirms that global policy makers should not soon expect rational adaptation to 
liberal markets where culturally valuable agricultural goods are threatened.  
Even beyond agriculture, it is hoped that readers of this thesis now better 
understand why a nation like France can be so inflexible when it comes to trade policy in 
culturally sensitive sectors.  The case of French wine suggests that certain pillars of 
identity are non-negotiable, even though they might find foundation in marketing 
manipulation, invented traditions and as second order effects of institutions like the AOC 
system, or some such other form of instrumentalism.  So, it stands to reason that unless 
policies reflecting cultural values are understood as virtually immovable chips on the 
international negotiating table, world leaders and trade representatives will continue to 
talk around each other, whether it is at the World Trade Organization, the European 
Union or in bilateral trade negotiations.  After cultural factors are taken into account, a 
more complete set of assumptions can emerge.  
 
A. FINDINGS 
Perhaps present day political forces and policies that are motivated by cultural 
considerations are not so irrational after all.  As exemplified here, that which is today 
understood as irrational can be rooted in instrumental rationality.  Additionally, the 
“irrational” cultural value can carry its own type of substantive rationality.  From the 
French perspective, it likely seems fairly rational to choose enduring regulation.  At its 
most fundamental level, the choice involves preserving “Frenchness” over acquiescing to 
the raw power of global markets.  Put in these terms, it is not difficult to comprehend the 
political impetus for the irrational outcome.  And while the effects of dismantling the 
French wine regulatory system can be estimated and is thus quantifiable, in no way is the 
value of identity quantifiable.  This reality too, makes the choice for protections seem, if 
not totally rational, then substantively rational, as Max Weber would put it. 
A review of the historical process that brought this value rationality to political 
terroir must start by acknowledging that some link from wine to French social culture has 
always existed, even going back to the early modern period.  During the nineteenth 
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century, wine marketers, especially those in Champagne and Bordeaux, leaned on this 
social tradition and invented its ties to identity in an effort to maximize profitability, 
which served to reinforce the salience of wine as a part of broader cultural identity.  As 
well, it seems the French wine industry as a whole sought to capitalize on the 
international and domestic demand for their product as a conduit of haute culture, an 
unintentional offshoot of which was to shape internal notions of “Frenchness.”   
At the turn of the century and in the years leading up to World War Two, the wine 
sector’s economic and political instability, which was largely provoked by phylloxera and 
la fraude, conditioned the massive government intervention that was the 1935 regulatory 
system.  As it turned out, this was the crucial intervening factor that spawned—as a 
second order effect—the second part of political terroir, wine diversity, which itself 
would eventually be linked to French identity.  In addition, the 1935 law further 
enshrined the culturally motivated ideas that wine should be styled in a traditional and 
natural fashion. In the second half of the twentieth century, all of these regulatory effects, 
over time, would embed themselves into a broader national cultural consciousness that 
regarded wine as reflecting “Frenchness” and haute culture. 
Today, the political will to defend the AOC regulatory system of 1935 stems more 
from a desire to protect French cultural identity than it does from the idea that the policy 
protects French wine from outside competition.  This is not to say that instrumentally 
rational considerations do not influence the perseverance of regulation or other forms of 
French wine protection, but rather that such considerations play a much lesser role than 
was the case in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Ultimately, the ascension of 
political terroir in France shows that instrumentally devised ideas and economic 
institutions can embed themselves in, and even serve to reinforce, notions of cultural 
identity.  In their present form, such cultural values go a long way to explain 
contemporary opposition to globalization and economic liberalism. 
 
B. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The French wine industry has long understood the logic behind removing 
protective mechanisms, yet it remains largely unable to move in that direction.  This 
analysis of the evolution of the underlying causes for the political protection of French 
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wine offers a fresh rationale for the continued defense of anti-liberal policies like the 
AOC regulatory system.  These ostensibly irrational policies remain in place mainly 
because, as this paper has shown, the culturally motivated “politics of terroir” is ever 
more important in France as the years pass.  With this in mind, the hope is that any new 
attempt to prescribe policy solutions will deal with the full situation, addressing both 
economic and cultural concerns. 
While the situation remains dire, la crise as a purely economic problem might not 
be hopeless.  Can the French wine industry work within the cultural constraints of 
political terroir to find a solution?  And is there anything revealed by the preceding 
analysis that might help meet that end?  One option would be to look to the example of 
Champagne and its current success.  Chapter IV showed how Champagne’s present-day 
prosperity is in many ways tied to the production conditions of the appellation.  With this 
in mind, the INAO might be inclined to try mirroring such conditions elsewhere in 
France.  Yet the ascendance of the second two parts of the “politics of terroir” is not 
appreciably present in Champagne, mainly due to a larger production zone and 
interventionist blending practices.  Thus, following Champagne’s lead would entail an 
abandonment of the idea that there is a French duty to protect variety, small-scale 
communal production, and traditional and natural production methods.  It simply would 
not be feasible under the current political culture. 
A second option would be to make minor adjustments without abandoning the 
regulatory system or completely embracing it.  This is actually what is happening right 
now.  Under this strategy, the areas most linked to quality and political terroir are being 
protected with the status quo, while the lesser regions are mostly left to fend for 
themselves.  The hope is that improved marketing, selectively liberal appellation 
standards and EU subsidies for the uprooting of vines will cure most of the problems.  
But, in effect, this has already been the industry strategy for the past half decade, and it 
has been widely regarded as ineffective.  Troubled regions, like the Languedoc-
Roussillon and elsewhere in the South, find themselves more imperiled today that ever 
before.193  Moreover, resistance to any movement in this direction, in other words, 
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departures from the culturally shaped principles of political terroir, remains fierce, even 
in the most economically stable regions.194  In short, today’s course does not seem 
sustainable. 
A third option, which stands in direct contrast to following the Champagne 
example, is recommended here.  This would be to embrace terroir to the fullest extent 
possible.  In fact, this is likely the path of least resistance considering the current 
trajectory of wine’s link to French culture.  Under this approach, two key actions are 
proposed.  First, the industry should make a concerted effort to sell the merits of terroir 
as a viticultural concept outside of France.  Second, winemaking standards should be 
improved through the strengthening of appellation decrees.   
Regarding a potential shift in marketing, focusing on the diversity of French wine, 
not just of varietals but also of site and season, would be a good place start.  Marketing 
French wine as being more naturally produced and more directly influenced by the land 
might help as well.  Then there is the question of production style.  Even though the 
social wines of the new world might be more approachable to the novice—which may 
well bring more wine drinkers into the fold initially—given their tendency toward high 
alcohol and a fruit forward flavor profile, many of these wine overwhelm food at the 
dinner table.  Perhaps a marketing campaign that proclaims, “France: Wines for Food,” 
would prove useful. 
This course of action relies to a degree on continued global market growth, in that 
as newer markets emerge in places like China and India, consumer tastes are expected 
evolve and mature, which should translate into a greater demand for variety.  Like no 
other country, France and its AOC system are poised to provide an almost limitless 
variety of wines.  Perhaps further down the development road, these budding markets 
will also demand natural and even traditional products.  That certainly is already the trend 
in more developed markets, where every day there is more demand for organic, natural 
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and small production goods.  Similarly, this strategy would aim to take advantage of 
consumer backlash against the consistency and product sameness that is a byproduct of 
globalizations big brands.  
The second endeavor, a route that should be taken in any event, is to shore up 
appellation decrees across the board, with a focus on the places where winemaking 
standards are wanting.  In doing so, the French wine industry would make great strides 
toward realizing consumers’ expectations of AOC wines.  As was seen in Chapter IV, 
many of the decrees, as they stand today, guarantee authenticity but not quality, even 
though many consumers believe quality to be a derivative of the AOC system.  The 
present situation, in which quality can be quite variable from one appellation to the next, 
and even within some appellations, is hurting the reputation of French wines in foreign 
markets.  While the permanence of the demand for natural, traditional and diverse wines 
might be up for debate, there will always be a market for high production standards, even 
at mid-range price points. 
French wine is still indicative of the heights of good taste in many places.  As 
such, France can expect demand for the social cachet it is selling to grow along with 
increased prosperity in developing markets.  Improving quality across the board can only 
help France capitalize on this demand for haute culture.  Apart from that, this move, if 
successful, would tap into some of the existing global demand for quality wines.  This, in 
turn, would fortify the perception of French wine as an indicator of status and good taste.  
It is a nice feedback loop, but one that will not be fully realized if quality standards 
remain as is.  Still, as this thesis has illustrated, it is a feedback loop the French are 
historically accustomed to exploiting. 
Of course these are, by and large, ill-informed proposals.  But it is clear that the 
AOC system in its current form gives rise to unique qualities that might be leveraged to 
the advantage of the French wine industry.  These are, especially, infinite diversity, a 
nostalgic link to nature and the past, and wines association with haute culture.  If these 
comparative advantages are endorsed, and an across-the-board leap in quality is 
embraced, the sacrosanct existing regulatory regime can remain intact for the foreseeable 
77 
future.  Such a policy shift also stands to bolster notions of wines value as a repository of 
both “Frenchness” and social status, which can only help French vignerons succeed in 
global wine markets.   
In final summary then, the “politics of terroir,” a culturally driven force involving 
the link from French wine to social traditions and national identity, has been postulated in 
this thesis as an important and ever-expanding reason for the apparently irrational 
continuation of wine regulation in France.  For the most part, its origins are found in 
nineteenth and early twentieth century instrumentalist motivations which aimed to bring 
rational economic advantage and political stability to France.  Eventually, however, these 
rational endeavors spawned a culturally embedded system of production whose second 
order effects continually reinforce the ideas intrinsic to the “politics of terroir.”  As a 
consequence, the enduring wine regulation in France perfectly illustrates how and why a 
substantively rational value, such as wine having “Frenchness,” can negatively impact 
ideas of cultural security, and in turn lead to seemingly irrational policy outcomes that 
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